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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines attitudes of individuals related to Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation within the context of interactions between organizational 
variables (level of employee pay, firm performance, and corporate social responsibility) 
and individual-level variables (equity sensitivity, race similarity to CEO, and 
respondent's pay). Vignettes (see Appendix A) were created in which respondents will 
have an opportunity to express their opinions on the distributive justice of CEO pay. The 
CEOs presented in the vignettes represented non-specific companies and had the same 
level of high total compensation. The respondents provided opinions of CEO pay and 
information about their own pay on a paper-and-pencil survey. 
I used correlation analysis, t-tests, and moderated hierarchical regression to 
investigate whether or not the assumed organizational and individual variables actually 
interacted to predict perceptions of distributive justice of CEO pay. This dissertation used 
three measures of attitudes: perceived distributive justice of CEO pay, perceived prestige 
of organization, and likelihood of buying a product from the organization. 
Results indicated that when the CEO's pay was perceived as fair, that respondents 
felt that the reputation of the firm was more positive. Additionally, if the pay of the 
employees in the vignettes was perceived by the respondents to be low, then the CEO pay 
was seen as less fair. However, respondent perceptions of the level of firm performance 
iii 
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and of corporate social responsibility in the vignette (high versus low) were not related to 
perceptions of the distributive justice of CEO pay. 
Interactions between respondents' equity sensitivity and the three organization-
level variables in the vignette were tested to determine if they related to distributive 
justice of CEO pay; however, only one interaction was supported. Further, respondents' 
demographic similarity to the CEO did not interact with organization-level variables to 
predict distributive justice of CEO pay. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines attitudes of individuals related to Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation within the context of interactions between organizational 
variables (level of employee pay, firm performance, and corporate social responsibility) 
and individual-level variables (equity sensitivity, race and gender similarity to CEO, and 
respondent's pay). Vignettes (see Appendix A) were created in which respondents will 
have an opportunity to express their opinions on the distributive justice of CEO pay. The 
CEOs presented in the vignettes represented non-specific companies and had the same 
level of high total compensation. The respondents provided opinions of CEO pay and 
information about their own pay on a paper-and-pencil survey. The relationships of the 
aforementioned variables are presented in the conceptual model in Figure 1.1. 
Organizational Variables 
- Level of employee pay 
- Firm performance 
- Corporate social 
responsibility 
Individual Variables 
- Equity sensitivity 
- Race and gender 
similarity to CEO 
- Respondent's pay 
Perceived 
distributive 
justice of 
CEO pay 
Outcomes 
- Perceived 
prestige of 
organization 
- Likelihood of 
patronizing the 
firm 
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Model 
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Statement of the Problem 
CEO compensation is a much-debated topic. According to an article in Executive 
Excess, in 2000, (Anderson, cavanagh, Hartman, & Leondar-Wright, 2001)after about 10 
years of rapid growth, an economic slowdown occurred. However, firms still gave big 
raises to CEOs. Executive pay jumped 571 percent between 1990 and 2000. During this 
same time, average worker pay barely outpaced inflation. Those CEOs that were involved 
in the most layoffs of ordinary workers earned 80 percent more than the average CEO in 
2000. Moreover, when CEOs cash in their stock options, their personal wealth grows and 
the company gets smaller tax bills. Those firms that received tax rebates gave CEOs an 
average raise of 69 percent compared to the average CEO raise of 38 percent. Also in 
2000, the top women CEOs earned one dollar for every thirteen dollars men CEOs 
received. Shareholder resolutions as well as other forms of complaints have brought 
attention to what many feel unfair compensations practices swayed toward the CEO 
while in most cases not even paying a living wage to ordinary workers. According to a 
report issued by a Boston, Massachusetts organization, Responsible Wealth, studies and 
surveys of business reveal that the benefits of paying decent wages include higher 
employee morale, better productivity, lower absenteeism, and lower turnover as well as 
improvements in quality and service {Executive Excess, 2001) (Anderson et al., 2001). 
Perceived wage inequality touches a lot of nerves and a lot of pocketbooks. Many 
people are incensed with top managers being paid multi-million dollars while overall 
paychecks remain small and in some cases workers are being laid off. Responsible 
Wealth, on behalf of its national network of business people, investors, and affluent 
Americans, filed 11 resolutions in 2000 asking corporate boards to reduce pay disparities 
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within their companies. These types of actions imply that people are becoming more 
vocal and persistent in quest to remedy the perceived injustices related to CEO pay. 
Several studies relating CEO pay to organizational performance have been 
conducted. Some have found there to be a positive relationship between pay and financial 
performance (Tai, 2004). Others have found a positive relationship between CSR and 
CEO pay (Deckop, Marriman, & Gupta, 2006). However, others have found pay to be 
out of line with performance (Bachelder, 2005). Never the less, very few studies have 
been conducted on attitudes related to CEO pay. All too often, the employment and 
compensation practices separate organizational members into the "haves" and the "have 
not" groups. Consequently, some women and minorities do not feel that they have a 
chance at responsible and prestigious positions. Moreover, members of these groups do 
not identify themselves with the contemporary CEOs' position. There might, in some 
cases, be resentment toward the CEO because of what might be considered neglect. This 
perceived neglect comes from the idea that CEOs are aware of the plight of 
disenfranchised organizational members and have the power—but apparently not the 
will—to improve employment opportunities for all organizational members. It is 
common knowledge that in most cases if not all, CEOs "call the shots" by 
institutionalizing what actions or practices they condone. It seems plausible then for an 
individual who feels deprived of opportunities for advancement or equitable pay to not 
comprehend or appreciate the level of CEO pay, relative to their own. Therefore, attitudes 
toward CEO pay were measured as well as respondents' identification with the CEOs' 
racial group and some potential consequences of that interaction are discussed. 
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Unfair treatment or perceived inequities result in relative deprivation and this 
could lead to distress and anger. Behavioral reactions to the distress and anger may result 
in lowered individual work performance and dissatisfaction and hence to lowered 
organizational performance, turnover and possibly litigation. Considering the power of 
mass media, public knowledge of these injustices could lead to a negative company 
image or lower external prestige. Corporate image or reputation influences the type of 
employees that are attracted to the firm as well as the level of customer patronage. If a 
firm hopes to recruit managerial candidates successfully, a negative reputation from wage 
inequality may harm their chances to do so. 
Need for Further Research 
There is very little empirical research relating employee attitudes to CEO 
compensation. However, Tremblay Sire, & Balkin (2000) discussed a strong link between 
organizational justice and corporate performance. Their theory suggests that 
organizational justice is linked to employee commitment and employee commitment is 
linked to corporate behavior. Moreover, they state that employee commitment improves 
by the perception of justice (Tremblay et al., 2000). In addition, employees have a 
tendency to decrease output or quit work if they perceived their salary levels were low 
overall (Terpstra & Honoree, 2005). With the current interest on CEO compensation, the 
time is now right to pursue this stream of research. Very little is shown in current 
literature about the impact of social identity on individual and organizational 
performance and CEO compensation. Therefore, this theoretical framework will attempt 
to explain and predict potential outcomes as a response to attitudes toward high CEO pay. 
5 
Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this dissertation was to test hypothesized relationships 
between organizational level variables (employee pay, firm performance, and corporate 
social performance) and perceptions of distributive justice of CEO pay within the context 
of individual level variables (equity sensitivity, demographic similarity to CEO). 
Specifically, I will use correlation analysis, t-tests, and moderated hierarchical regression 
to investigate whether or not the assumed organizational and individual variables actually 
interacted to predict perceptions of distributive justice of CEO pay. This dissertation used 
three measures of attitudes: perceived distributive justice of CEO pay, perceived prestige 
of organization, and likelihood of buying a product from the organization. 
The second purpose of this study was to test hypotheses drawn from Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and equity theory. Testing hypotheses is critical in the 
development of a theoretical framework. Research on CEO compensation suggests that in 
many cases there are no strong relationships between CEO compensation and firm 
performance (Finklestein & Hambrick, 1988; Tosi et al., 2000). In addition, public 
knowledge about CEO compensation has left many "not so fortunate ones" to question 
the fairness of the system. Moreover, some people believe that weight given to factors 
unrelated to merit makes it extremely difficult for them to achieve the same level of 
success as those in power. Therefore, it is necessary to isolate those instances where these 
areas of concern are prevalent and the system does not seem fair. Conversely, we 
attempted to identify and benchmark those areas where equitable reward systems, 
positive mental attitudes, firm performance, stakeholder interests and CEO compensation 
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are properly aligned. This dissertation used hypotheses related to the listed theories to test 
them. 
Contributions of the Study 
The major contribution of this study is that it offers the opportunity for greater 
understanding of the impact of CEO compensation on external stakeholders in addition to 
the impact on potential stakeholders (potential employees, special interest group 
members, and potential customers). CEO compensation is a "hot" topic. Therefore, 
understanding how it impacts stakeholders could aid managers in mitigating potential 
repercussions as well as in taking advantage of some opportunities that could benefit their 
firms. Ultimately, this dissertation offers implications and insight into how organizations 
might enhance performance through adopting policies that maximize employee inputs 
while avoiding potentially negative side effects. 
Plan of Study 
Chapter 1 provided a statement of the problem, the need for further research, and 
contributions of the study. Additionally, a figure detailing the study model was provided. 
Chapter 2 discusses related literature and the hypotheses. Chapter 3 includes the sampling 
methods used, data collection techniques, and statistical techniques. The results of the 
data analysis are included in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 includes the conclusions of the 
study, the limitations of the study, organizational implications and recommendations for 
future research. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
This chapter serves as a review of existing literature concerning attitudes towards 
CEO compensation and presents hypotheses that were subsequently examined. The first 
section reviews common conceptualizations and elements of CEO compensation and 
provides a definition for CEO compensation. The following section identifies the 
theoretical framework used as basis for this study. Empirical work related to each 
framework was examined. 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation included concepts from agency 
theory, equity theory, identity theory, perceived external prestige, and corporate social 
responsibility. The organizational moderators (which are manipulated in the different 
vignettes) include: level of employee pay, firm performance, and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Employee pay refers to the overall average level of compensation 
of individuals working for specific organizations receive. Firm performance consists of 
the financial performance of the firm (e.g., market value added or return on investment-
profitability). CSR refers to social contributions made to society by organizations under 
study. The individual moderators (which are measured characteristics of the study's 
respondents) include: equity sensitivity, race similarity to CEO, and respondent's pay. 
Equity sensitivity refers to the degree of tolerance or intolerance people have for 
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inequitable situations or treatment. This chapter concludes with the hypothesis 
formulation. 
CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation includes direct and indirect benefits CEOs get for their 
contributions to organizations. However, total cash compensation, which includes the 
sum of salary and bonus, is an effective proxy for measures including deferred 
compensation; plus it has been used in most studies of CEO compensation (Boyd, 1994). 
Included in CEO compensation are stock options, stock grants and other fringe benefits. 
According to a 2001 BusinessWeek survey, the average CEO of a major U. S. 
company earned $15.5 million in total compensation. This figure was actually down from 
the year 2000 but the number is skewed by declines in sizable pay packages for the 
largest companies (BusinessWeek, 2002). Actual CEO pay was larger in 2002 than it was 
in the late 1990s. In 2002, CEO pay was 531 times that of the average hourly worker. In 
2007, CEOs received 364 times what the average American worker received. The 
average CEO pay in 2006 was $10.4 million (Anderson et al., 2007). In this vein, 
research on the ordinary worker, has found that absenteeism and turnover are affected by 
perceptions of pay equity (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). 
The complexity of CEO pay cannot be easily understood through simple models 
because they result in inadequate conclusions. The economic, social, political, and 
individual forces must be considered jointly in order for effective analysis to occur 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). CEOs, by some standards, may be over-rewarded for 
what they do; however, there are others who feel that CEOs deserve what they get paid. 
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While CEO pay in the U.S. does seem overly large to some people, one must be 
vigilant in keeping CEO compensation in the proper context. The responsibility of the 
CEO compared to other employees must be considered, as this responsibility may 
warrant higher levels of pay. CEO responsibilities can be compressed into three areas. 
First a CEO must be a visionary, a problem solver, and a communicator. This requires 
environmental scanning and ensuring proper response from the organization. Second, the 
CEO must be a role model and leader. Third, the CEO must set effective performance 
standards and make sure they are being met. These functions must be performed 
regardless of the competitiveness or the complexity of the environments (McClayland, 
2002). 
One of the hallmarks of attractive and desirable CEOs is their perceived ability to 
breathe new life into a firm. Research has shown that a CEO's track record and 
established reputation in developing and successfully implementing so called popular 
management techniques in past engagements (quality circles, empowerment, and teams, 
total quality management programs) correlates strongly with pay the CEO receives in a 
new position. However, the same research found no correlation between implementation 
of these popular management techniques in organizations and the actual business 
performance of those organizations (Staw & Epstein, 2000). 
Al Dunlap was notorious for his pro CEO philosophy and earned the legend of 
"chain saw" Al. His reputation was achieved through his apparent insensitivity toward 
workers when he was called upon to position companies for viability through downsizing 
of rightsizing. Thousands of workers were laid off while he held to the philosophy that 
"you can not overpay a good CEO" (Dunlap & Andelman, 1997). Hiring the best CEO 
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money can buy, and tying CEO compensation to company performance, seems plausible 
since one role of CEOs is to continually improve the financial health of the firm. 
Unfortunately, Dunlap's declaration is not consistent with public opinion. 
Evidence suggests that good CEOs can be overpaid (Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson et 
al., 2007). Further, tying compensation to shareholder returns raises serious ethical 
questions. Finally, there is a widespread belief within academia, industry, the popular 
press, and among the public that much of the ethical misconduct in business during the 
latter half of the 1990s can be blamed on excessive incentive packages offered to CEOs. 
These packages, in combination with soaring equity prices and relatively lax institutional 
controls, have offered yielding temptation for CEOs to take whatever actions needed to 
keep a company's stock price high (Piper, 2002). 
Clearly, CEOs have considerable responsibilities in the firm. Nevertheless, there 
is a broad based outcry against the level of CEO pay given ordinary worker pay (Pfeffer, 
2006). In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed a set of 
new rules designed to facilitate disclosure of executive compensation and to more fully 
explain the criteria used in setting compensation. In 1992, U. S. executive compensation 
was substantially higher than that of their counterparts in Europe or Asia. In the early to 
mid nineties, the U.S. CEO of a mid-sized firm had an average compensation of 
$717,237. CEOs of similar sized firms averaged $439,441 in Britain, and $390,723 in 
Japan (Boyd, 1994). Similar trends continue have continued. According to a recent 
article in the Wall Street Journal, the typical British CEO earns slightly more than half of 
what U. S. CEOs make ($1.2 million to $2.2 million respectively). The Towers Perrin 
study compared executive compensation packages for 26 countries and indicated that 
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bonuses and long-term incentives make up a larger proportion of U.S. CEO pay packages 
as compared to Britain's (62 percent to 35 percent respectively) (Ossinger, 2006). Labor 
unions, workers, and in some cases special interests groups as well as the general public 
are interested in the level of CEO compensation. In many cases, it is often felt that CEO 
pay is too high relative to the plight of the ordinary workers' (pay and job security) 
(Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2007). 
There are no hard and fast rules on executive compensation. However, the 
makeup of the board of directors and the board's vigilance in making sure that all 
stakeholders' interests are represented has a lot to do with preventing conflicting 
performance goals from occurring. Compensation committee structure most often 
influence whether all stakeholders interests are represented or not. According to Felo 
(2001), this is not always the case, especially if too many committee members are from 
the inside. 
Evidence suggests that many directors, even those sitting on board compensation 
committees, are ill qualified to proffer opinions on executive compensation (Elson, 
2003). Therefore, many boards rely on compensation consultants for expertise and 
advice. Frequently, though, these are the same people who work in other consulting areas 
or are otherwise already retained for other purposes. This situation is fraught with 
potential conflicts of interest. To mitigate such conflicts, some board compensation 
committees have hired independent compensation consultants (as now advocated by 
recently promulgated New York Stock Exchange rules). Unfortunately, in many cases 
these consultants eventually feud with company-retained consultants, rendering the 
process quite ineffective (Elson, 2003). 
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As shown to this point, many well-intentioned aspects of CEO compensation have 
failed to produce the intended effects. Weinberg and Hiller (1994) set forth several such 
common CEO compensation practices that could produce unintended consequences. 
These included: (1) Large stock option grants with a grant value (defined as the exercise 
price times the number of shares) at least three times the CEO's basic salary. Objections 
to this practice noted by Weinberg included transferring too much wealth from 
shareholders to CEOs, creating too large a pay disparity between CEOs and average 
workers, and not tying the reward to performance, meaning that even poor performance 
could create an enormous option value; (2) In situations where an industry image is not 
attractive to investors, board compensation committees will not to take whatever steps 
they feel will motivate CEOs to restore investor confidence in the firm. In such cases, 
compensation committees rely too heavily on stock options, reasoning that CEOs will 
profit handsomely from a more valuable company. The complexities and dynamics of the 
market challenge this logic. CEOs, who believe their superior performance in certain 
situations, do not improve the company's financial position or the value of their options, 
might look for more favorable opportunities with other firms. 
Concern is often expressed that attractive stock option plans dilute a company's 
value. While many high technology firms believe their continued growth and consequent 
stock price rises will minimize any dilution impacts, other firms are less sanguine. These 
latter firms try to minimize dilution concerns by repurchasing shares whenever 
employees exercise options. This strategy requires cash, which typically is either funded 
from internal reserves (which reduces the value of the firm) or is borrowed, (which 
further leverages the balance sheet). Either approach compromises shareholder interests. 
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Recently, the tendency for company compensation committees to grant failed 
CEOs large severance packages has drawn considerable attention in the media, scrutiny 
by regulators and anger from shareholders. While the direct financial impact of large 
severance packages may not contribute materially to the overall decline in a company's 
value, such favorable arrangements have an important second order effect. Over-
rewarding a CEO has a negative impact on shareholders, retirement savings for workers 
and the morale of employees. However, the boards of directors set CEO pay. There is 
growing belief that the boards of directors are failing to police CEOs and serve as 
stakeholders' representatives in the boardroom. An AFL-CIO official recently explained 
his frustration with numbers. In the last 25 years the ratio of CEO pay has grow from 42 
to 1 to 364 to 1 (Ryan, 2008). Union officials are now asking Congress to pass a "sat on 
pay" law which will allow - if passed - nonbinding shareholder vote on executive pay 
plans of publicly traded companies. This measure will motivate corporate boards to 
engage shareholders in meaningful dialogue about appropriate levels of CEO pay before 
it is approved (Ryan, 2008). 
Some of the happenings of the 1990s have presented challenges as well as 
opportunities. Increasing stock option packages, a fast rising stock market, and poorly 
monitored and enforced internal procedures and controls, have placed enormous 
temptations in the way of corporate executives and other employees (Piper, 2002). 
The compensation mix, or the proportion of long-term incentives in a 
compensation contract, may serve to align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders by rewarding CEOs only if shareholder returns are enhanced (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Long-term incentives reduce 
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the need for constant monitoring (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). 
While stakeholders favor long-term incentives, CEOs (for personal reasons) generally do 
not primarily because can benefit only if the firm performs well (Gomez-Mejia, 1987; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994). CEOs realize that pay linked to long-term performance takes 
into account not only those factors they have control over, but critical factors that they do 
not have control over as well. Some major factors of concern include aggregate market 
demand and stock market fluctuations, which can increase the volatility of compensation 
(Hill & Phan, 1991). Furthermore, long-term incentives granted in the form of stock 
increases a CEO's firm specific investment and, consequently, the associated risk (Beatty 
& Zajac, 1994). CEOs would presumably prefer to retain control over their pay by getting 
compensated through cash, thereby limiting the extent to which their income is exposed 
to risk. Consistent with these arguments, research has shown that incentive alignment is 
greater in owner controlled than in manager-controlled firms (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 
1989) and that, when CEOs gain power-as they do, for instance, when they also hold the 
board chairperson title-the compensation mix reflects CEO preferences for minimizing 
the long-term component of pay (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). The 
importance of linking CEO performance with the overall objectives of stakeholders 
resides in agency theory. 
Even though I have discussed aspects and rationale for CEO compensation, I feel 
as though the general public, represented by the respondents to this survey, still has 
misgivings related to CEO pay. Rising or extremely high CEO pay for the productive as 
well as the non-productive executive has left even some advocates of pay for 
performance wondering whether the balance between the CEO and the shareholder is 
15 
tilting the wrong way (Byrne, 1996; Anderson et al., 2007)). Agency theory has been 
relied upon to get ideal efforts from CEOs. This effort has not completely led to desired 
results of stakeholders, including the CEOs themselves. 
Agency theory has been defined as a separation of corporate ownership and 
control. It permits owners or principals to freely transfer ownership of the firm without 
disrupting operations because the agents or managers have taken over the controls of the 
firm (Fama & Jenson, 1983). As firms grow and compete, there could be many benefits 
to agents and principals alike. CEOs are agents of stakeholders and are therefore 
responsible to shareholders and other stakeholders for the performance of the firm. 
Principals are stakeholders other than the CEO who have some form of ownership or 
interest in the firm. As firms grow in size or complexity, it often becomes wise for 
owners or principles to enlist competent leadership or management. 
The demand for additional skill sets or competencies are not uncommon in a 
competitive business environment. Professional managers play a significant role in 
sustaining and advancing organizations through different stages of growth. However, 
sometimes agency costs rise where the best interest of the firm is not in the best interest 
of the CEO. As a result, a contract must be developed to ensure that the manager's 
interests are aligned with those of the stakeholders. The contract may be classified as 
either behavior oriented (e.g. merit) or outcome oriented (e.g. stock options or 
commission (Eisenhardt, 1988). Moreover, the contract could contain long-term or short-
term components of pay. 
Even though agency theory has been promoted as a reasonable approach to 
matching up the interests of agents (managers) and principals (stakeholders), there still 
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seem to be some imbalance in terms of outcomes. This imbalance refers to the rewards or 
outcomes of the relative contributions made by the CEO as compared to other 
stakeholders. CEOs get paid well even though in many cases the firm is not profitable, 
socially responsible or workers might be underpaid or laid off. Therefore, the corporate 
board, in its deliberations with the CEO, must ensure that the contract calls for not only 
reasonable financial performance measures, but social or contextual performance 
measures as well. 
In relations to financial measures, CEOs need to be held to higher standards of 
equity since the additional costs incurred as people attempt to restore equity diminishes 
the bottom line. In addition, hiring individuals of underrepresented groups could have 
positive effects on operations as well as sales. Therefore, tying part of the CEOs' pay to 
these variables seems plausible. 
In this study, I investigate attitudes related to CEO pay when that pay is perceived 
as being high. To determine high pay, I conducted a pilot study using a sample very 
similar to that for the actual dissertation. This pilot study and the subsequent 
determination of "high" compensation are discussed in the methods section. The 
variables in the study, then, were all manipulated or measured in the context of this high 
CEO pay. 
Dependent Variables 
Distributive Justice 
Equity theory had its beginnings in personnel management. Henri Fayol, an 
organizational theorist, discussed it as one of his original fourteen principles (Nickels, 
McHugh, & McHugh, 2002). Fayol's principles were established to solve persistent 
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organizational problems of that era. Adams (1963) made major contributions to the 
theory. As of today however, problems with fairness or justice and the many benefits that 
can be derived from equity are yet unrealized. On several occasions, equity theory has 
been advanced to address this issue. 
According to Adams, inequity exists when a person is overpaid or underpaid 
relative to another person (Adams, 1963). This can be perceived in a direct exchange or 
(b) when both are in an exchange relationship with a third party. The theory states that 
employees will be better satisfied if they think they are compensated fairly. If an 
employee believes that his or her ratio of inputs-to-outcomes is equal to the ratio of 
inputs-to-outcomes of "others", the work situation is fair. "Others" could refer to 
employees on the same job, same industry, or any worker anywhere, though the impact 
might be stronger among coworkers. 
Social exchanges have the potential to be deemed just or unfair. Adams (1963) 
has deemed the unfair exchanges as relative deprivation. When relative deprivation 
exists, dissatisfaction occurs. Relative deprivation is the unfair violations of expectations. 
Relative deprivation raises a question about distributive justice. There are three main 
types of justice related to equity theory: distributive justice, procedural justice and 
interactional justice. Distributive justice is related to the perceived justice of allocation 
outcomes (Barber & Simmering, 2002) and is the focus of this section as well as this 
dissertation. According to Goodman and Friedman (1971), the basic assumptions, 
propositions, and derivations of Adams' theory of inequity have support. They can be 
divided into two general classes: those dealing with the conditions of inequity and those 
dealing with the resolution of inequity. 
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According to Homans (1961), distributive justice among men who are in an 
exchange process occurs when the profits of each are proportional to their investments. 
Profits refer to what is received minus what it cost to generate or realize what is received. 
Cost refers to what is given up in the exchange. Investments in the exchange are the 
attributes such as skill, effort, education, training, age, gender, and ethnic background. 
When inequality between the proportions exists, a feeling of injustice will arise and one 
party will experience deprivation (Adams, 1963). Obviously, when one feels deprived, 
the resultant dissatisfaction can lead to behaviors to rectify the sense of distributive 
justice. Some examples include withdrawing effort, filing grievances or some other 
counterproductive behaviors. 
However, the theory of distributive justice suggests that when two or more 
individuals receive their rewards from a third party such as an employer, each individual 
will expect the employer to maintain a fair ratio of rewards relative to inputs or 
contributions. Theoretically, inequity exists whether a person is relatively overpaid or 
relatively underpaid, though the threshold is much higher when an individual is overpaid 
(Adams, 1963; Goodman & Friedman, 1971). 
However, one person might not perceive the situation the same as the next person. 
Moreover, two employees might disagree on the value or weight to be given their 
contributions (Adams, 1963). In addition, there might be situations where one individual 
perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs to another individual's ratio of outcomes 
to inputs is unequal. This situation can happen when two individuals are in a direct 
exchange relationship or when they are in an exchange relationship with a third party. In 
either scenario, a perceived (or real) inequity exists. 
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In the case of different work groups, one group might compare the importance of 
his or her group to the organization with the importance of another group to the 
organization. If the groups are perceived to be equal in terms of importance to the 
organization, the rewards are expected to be equal. In order for equity to exist, this must 
be the case. Importance can be accounted for through the comparisons made between 
efforts, skills, length of service, or type of work performed of the two groups (Adams, 
1963). Others have focused their writings on perceived or real inequities as well. 
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that a worker might 
compare his or her pay to another person's pay relative to dimensions of pay such as 
skill, education and seniority. When inequities exist from the comparison of the two 
proportions, cognitive dissonance is experienced. When cognitive dissonance is 
experienced, dissatisfaction occurs. Very little research had been done to determine what 
the consequences of perceived injustices were other than dissatisfaction prior to Adams's 
work (Adams, 1963). Adams suggested that experiences of injustice do not have to be 
accepted as a way of life. More research should be done so that a better general 
understanding of this phenomenon can be held and so that a degree of social control can 
be realized. Obviously, four decades have elapsed, more studies have been done; 
however, inequities still exist. 
Some equity theorists posit that inequity results in tension and distress. As one 
might expect, the inequities are followed by consequences. Some approaches possibly 
used by dissatisfied individuals and discussed by Adams (1963) include: (1) person 
altering his inputs, (2) person altering his outcomes, (3) person distorting his inputs and 
outcomes cognitively, (4) person leaving the field, (5) person acting on other, (6) person 
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changing the object of comparison, and (7) choice among modes of inequity reduction 
(Adams, 1963). 
First, a person may vary inputs by increasing or decreasing them, depending on 
whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous. An individual might increase productivity 
or the quality of work if possible. On the other hand, a person might restrict production if 
possible. There are instances though when a person cannot alter inputs (i.e. gender, age, 
seniority, or ethnicity). Second, a person might vary his or her outcomes by increasing or 
decreasing them depending on whether the inequity is advantageous or disadvantageous 
to that individual. Third, substantial distortion is difficult because individuals are strongly 
influenced by reality; however, a person might cognitively distort inputs or outcomes to a 
degree. The direction of the distortion will be consistent with the nature of cognitive 
distortions. Fourth, the magnitude of the perceived inequity will impact whether a person 
quits the job, obtain a transfer or miss work more often or resort to some other means. 
Fifth, a person might attempt to influence or cognitively distort the other persons input or 
outputs or even try to influence the individual to leave the job (Adams, 1963). Leventhal 
(1964) suggests that it would be easier to get a person to accept greater outcomes than 
fewer outcomes. On the other hand, it would be better to get a person to lower inputs than 
to increase them. Sixth, a person might compare him or herself with another person. This 
is obviously difficult to do if the comparison other has been used for a long time. The 
individual would first have to make him or herself non-comparable to the previous person 
on one or more dimensions. The comparative other person might be given an increase in 
responsibility. This alone will justify an individual changing comparison partners. 
However, if no perceived differences have occurred over the long haul and outcomes for 
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comparison others exceed the outcomes of the comparing other, perceived injustice will 
persist (Adams, 1963). 
The theory states that employees will be better satisfied if they think they are 
compensated fairly. On the other hand, if workers feel that they are being deprived 
justice, it is plausible to assume some of them will attempt to restore justice. This could 
result in them going public or exposing the organization in a negative light. It this 
happens, the organizations' image might be impacted. This could have dire marketing or 
recruiting consequences for organization. In addition, production employees might have a 
desire to leave for more attractive options (companies). Moreover, internal strife, 
whatever the cause, might eventually impact the perceived prestige of an organization 
and consequently the bottom line. 
Perceived Organizational Prestige 
The image an organization portrays impacts significantly the level of prestige its 
members' possess. However, it would appear that conflicts might evolve if individual 
organizational members are not satisfied with the social exchange process or the rewards 
they receive for the contributions they make to the organization. Moreover, if hiring or 
promotion practices adversely impact certain protected or disgruntled groups (i.e., ethnic 
or gender), a degree of resentment might cloud the image employees have of the 
organizations that might otherwise be praised by outsiders. Whether employee 
appointments, promotions, pay-raises, or pay are perceived as fair or not, external 
perceptions might be altered with the next complaint, news report, or lawsuit. 
If worker outcomes are not considered fair, it seems plausible to expect affected 
employees to choose to employ one of the approaches to restore equity. If the perceived 
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problems are not effectively mitigated internally, the possibility exists for affected 
employees to choose an alternative (i.e. legal action, slacking, and self-selection) that 
might result in a tarnished image or counter productivity unnecessarily. 
March and Simon (1958) proposed that if employees perceived that people 
external to the organization held their firms in high esteem, the individual employee 
would become attached to the organization. If certain workers feel this way, they might 
even relish being a part of such an organization. However, internal corporate problems 
related to equity or social issues can escalate and result in a damaged corporate image. 
Perceived External Prestige (PEP) answers the question "what do outsiders think 
of me because I belong to this organization?" or "what is the social value of 
organizational membership?" (Dutton, et al., 1994). This project answers the more 
important and persistent question such as, "What is the effect of fairness on PEP?" 
Moreover, knowledge of the possible impact of organizational image on performance 
might be beneficial to any organization member or stakeholder. 
The contention here is that some employees expect organizations to "practice 
what they preach." If the public relations campaigns used by companies to influence a 
positive external image of the firm are inconsistent with perceived internal practices, 
some employees could feel deprivation. In the process of restoring equity, the 
organization could be exposed in a negative light, resulting in strained relationships and 
the loss of critical stakeholders such as partners, customers and employees. However, 
regardless of how employees perceive corporate behavior, relative to image, there could 
still be pressures to leave or to stay with the company. However, likelihood of people 
"rolling with the punches" will possibly decrease as relative deprivation increases. If 
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employees are not satisfied with a firm relative to image, or perceive themselves as being 
deprived, their behavior will reflect those feelings somehow. Depending on the size of 
the firm and what products and services they sell, this could have marketing implications. 
These individuals might not patronize that particular firm. 
Likelihood of Patronizing a Firm 
The perception of fairness and the lack of fairness could dictate whether 
individuals are motivated to react in a certain way. In addition to the actions already 
stated regarding restoring equity, individuals might be moved to boycott or avoid 
purchasing products or services from firms that are perceived as unfair. Employees make 
excellent customers and can have a significant impact on the bottom line. However, the 
probability of individuals patronizing a firm depends on several factors. Scholars have 
known this for some time now and have developed models to explain consumer behavior. 
A brief discussion of models related to consumer behavior will follow. 
The economic man model represents an ideal buyer who thinks exclusively in 
rational terms. It assumes individual's needs are unlimited but resources are limited. 
Decisions and purchases are based on economic considerations and need satisfaction. If 
given a choice, customers will want the lower priced product or service (Husted, Varble, 
& Lowery, 1989). 
The psychoanalytic model, based on the work of Sigmund Freud, assumes that 
subconscious forces influence one to behave instinctively, consciously, and logically. 
This model posits that some behavior cannot be explained by economic principles. 
However, because of the range of possible subconscious motivations, an accurate 
explanation of consumer behavior is hard to pin point (Husted ,Varble, & Lowery, 1989). 
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Armstrong and Kotler (2005), developed a consumer behavior model that 
somewhat overlapped the psychoanalytic model. The components listed included: (1) 
culture, (2) social, (3) personal, and, (4) psychological factors. The cultural factors 
included the basic culture, subculture, and social class. Culture influences people to want 
something or to behave in a certain way. It can be defined as the set of basic values, 
perceptions, wants, and behaviors learned by a member of society from family or other 
important institutions. In addition, subcultures include nationalities, religions, racial 
groups and geographic regions. Social class is a relatively permanent and ordered 
division in a society whose members share similar attributes such as values, interests, and 
behaviors (Armstrong & Kotler, 2005). The social factors that influence behavior include 
reference or member groups, and family. Moreover, the roles and status of individuals 
help identify products individual have a tendency to buy as well (Armstrong & Kotler, 
2005). 
The personal factor includes occupation, age and lifecycle stage, personality and 
self-concept. The final factor, psychological, include motivation, perception, learning, 
beliefs and attitudes. Motivation was described as a need that is sufficiently pressing to 
direct one to seek satisfaction of that need. Perception was defined as the process by 
which individuals select, organize and interpret information to form a picture of the 
world. Attitudes are a person's enduring favorable or unfavorable cognitive evaluations, 
feelings and tendencies toward some object or idea (Kotler, 1984). The attitude 
component of this model has direct application to this project. 
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Some people might or might not be stimulated to patronize a firm if they have a 
positive attitude toward the firm, whether that positive attitude is moderated through 
positive perceptions of prestige, equity, CSR, or employee satisfaction or not. However, 
if the attitudes are negative relative to those factors, Armstrong and Kotler's (2005) 
theory suggests that individuals will not patronize firms in this case. Therefore, the 
assumption is held that employees who are dissatisfied with a particular situation at their 
firm might not be inclined to support the firm wholeheartedly. This attitude could spill 
over into respective cultural groups. Whatever the case might be, CEOs, in light of their 
sometimes handsome pay, have the power to mitigate most employee concerns. In reality, 
employees are sometimes considered ambassadors for the companies they work for. 
Employee opinions are sometimes the driving factor in selling a particular organization. 
In addition, employees make good customers. It might prove cumbersome to sell a 
product to others if a company's own employees will not purchase them. Moreover, a lot 
of purchasing power resides with gainfully employed people. According to the 2000 
Census report, African Americans as well as Hispanics control over $500 billion worth of 
purchasing power each. Female consumers control even more. Moreover, women and 
minorities make up a major portion of the workforce. Nevertheless, fair participation and 
rewards systems should be based on good business acumen. If employees attitudes are 
impacted negatively because of perceived inequities or if relative deprivation sets in, one 
employees' exposed unwillingness to purchase his or her company's product could have 
a snowball effect and lead to declining market opportunities. 
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For example, Denny's Corporation, as a result of discrimination lawsuits filed in 
the early 1990s estimated three years later, that it lost $100 million per year in sales. 
Needless to say, now racial diversity initiatives have been implemented from the 
corporate board down throughout its restaurants (Cole, 2005). Regardless of the makeup 
of the workforce, however, all demographic groups have experienced unfairness. 
Summary of Expected Outcomes 
I anticipated that the level of CEO total compensation would be related to the 
three outcomes of perceived distributive justice of CEO pay, the perceived prestige of the 
organization, and the likelihood of patronizing a firm. I did not make any predictions 
about the main effects of this relationship. This is because in the study, I used only one 
level of CEO compensation—that which pilot testing indicated was perceived as high. 
Because the focus of this study is on high CEO pay, there is no need to vary the level of 
compensation. Thus, the analyses were focused on the relationship among the moderators 
and the outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived distributive justice of CEO pay will be positively related 
to the perceived prestige of the organization and the likelihood of patronizing a 
firm. 
Organizational-Level Variables and Attitudes 
towards CEO Pay 
The organizational-level variables used in this study included firm performance 
(profitability), employee pay and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). These variables 
are presented in vignettes and were therefore be manipulated, not measured. However, 
the representation of these variables in vignette form was intended to reflect actual U.S. 
business situations 
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Level of Employee Pay 
Employee pay refers to direct compensation as well as indirect compensation 
received by fictitious employees in the vignettes. According to representatives of the 
AFL-CIO, CEO compensation has grown too dramatically and out of proportion to 
employee pay. In addition, the CEO-to-worker wage gap is rising. The ratio of CEO pay 
was 301: 1 in 2003, up from 282:1 in 2002. If the minimum wage had increased as 
quickly as CEO pay since 1990, it would presently exceed $15.76 per hour as compared 
to $5.15 per hour workers are now guaranteed under the law. Moreover, firms are still 
cutting jobs while CEO pay is rising. However, public pressure is beginning to have an 
impact, however small. Investors are beginning to demand greater accountability from 
the CEOs (U. S. Newswire, 2004). AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer, Richard Trunka has 
been urging shareholders to take proactive steps to stop runaway CEO pay. He feels that 
compensation committee directors should not be supported when attempting to approve 
excessive CEO pay (PR Newswire, 2002). 
Hypothesis 2: Level of employee pay will be positively related to perceived 
distributive justice of CEO pay. When employees are more highly paid, CEO pay 
will be seen as more fair. 
Firm Performance 
Firm performance is represented as financial performance (profitable or 
unprofitable) in the vignettes; either the firm met financial goals or it did not. Firm 
performance has been paramount in the study of organizations. 
Many studies have been conducted to study the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO pay. Therefore, firm performance will be discussed in tandem with 
CEO pay. There several measures or metrics used to measure firm performance. 
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Financial performance may be defined as short-term return on equity and long-term 
return on assets (Tosi et al., 2000). Other studies have measured performance using 
economic value added (the difference between net operating profit after taxes and total 
cost of capital). Market value added is the difference between market value - debt plus 
equity - and investor funds since inception. In addition, stock price is often seen as a 
performance metric leading many CEO to receive lucrative options packages. Moreover, 
nearly 80 percent of the gain in CEO compensation for the past 10 years has come from 
stock options (Elson, 2003). 
Conventional belief in determining CEO compensation is that a correlation exists 
between compensation and company performance. Research does not support such a 
correlation. As a matter of fact, CEO pay often rises while business falls off and layoffs 
occur. Sheikholeslami (2001) investigated total CEO compensation in relation to 
contemporary performance measures. Iyengar (2002) reported studies that showed 
managers' compensation being largely unaffected when firms performed poorly. Tosi et 
al. (2000), found only a small percentage of variation in CEO compensation could be 
explained by a change in financial performance. 
However, when the firm is performing well, respondents are more likely to 
believe that high CEO pay is fair. According to Walters, Hadin, & Schick (1995), high 
pay is perceived as fair when pay is linked to organizational performance. Moreover, this 
argument is consistent with equity theory which incorporates contributions to a firm in 
the form of inputs to outputs or rewards. If CEOs are instrumental in increasing 
shareholder wealth, they are entitled to be justly compensated for it. 
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Hypothesis 3: Firm performance will be positively related to perceived 
distributive justice of CEO pay. When the firm is meeting financial goals, CEO 
pay will be seen as more fair. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
According to Nickels, McHugh, and McHugh (2005), CRS is the concern 
businesses have for society. Specifically, businesses are responsible to customers, 
investors, employees, society, and the environment. Businesses should create wealth, 
promote social justice, and satisfy customers by offering real value in products and 
services. These authors note that honesty goes a long way in satisfying customers. CSR 
can be a function of organization size or success. Moreover, it can be a direct result of the 
philosophy of the CEO. Some firms are now holding their CEOs responsible for social 
goals by tying some elements of compensation to the social goals. Thus, elements of what 
constitute CSR will be represented in the study vignettes. 
In addition to financial or market performance, firms find themselves accountable 
now to stakeholders regarding social responsibility. Prior to the 1950s, the two distinct 
theories of management were administrative and sociological. Administrative theory 
focused on internal operations and structures. Taylor's (1911) and his followers' works 
were rooted in engineering and experimentation in an attempt to optimize efficiency or 
productivity. The sociology stream was known as "social organization." The aim of this 
social analysis was to understand how the institutional sphere (education, family and 
economy, etc.) was structured and how developments in one affected the other (Stern & 
Barley, 1996). 
A particularly influential theorist on this stream was Talcott Parsons. In his essay 
"Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," he disclosed 
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three foci: (1) adaptation of an organization to the situation in which it must operate 
(which dealt with resource acquisition, dependence, and transaction cost theory), (2) 
mechanisms of implementations (which dealt with structures, processes and decision 
making relative to goal attainment), and (3), mechanisms by which the organization is 
integrated with other entities in the total social system (excluding relationships between 
organizations and their environments, because that was the thrust of the first focus),(Stern 
& Barley, 1996). 
One of the early opponents of social responsibility was Milton Freidman. In 1962, 
he argued that the doctrine of social responsibility was "fundamentally subversive". He 
felt that the trend of social responsibility would undermine the foundation of a free 
society if it included anything other than profit maximization for stockholders (Caroll, 
1979). 
However, early writers indicated that business seldom had so much power with so 
little responsibility. Carroll (1979) observed that the "social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has 
of organizations at a given point in time." In 1986, Frederick summed up the position as: 
"The fundamental idea of 'corporate social responsibility' is that business corporations 
have an obligation to work for social betterment" (Wood, 1991). 
The CEO has become a key player in society's renewed emphasis on social 
responsibility. Conventional belief in determining CEO compensation is that a correlation 
exists between compensation and company performance. Research does not support such 
a correlation. As a matter of fact, CEO pay often rises while business falls off and layoffs 
occur. Sheikholeslami (2001) investigated total CEO compensation - defined as base 
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salary, benefits, cash bonuses, and deferred compensation - in relation to contemporary 
performance measures of what he termed economic value added (the difference between 
net operating profit after taxes and total cost of capital) and market value added (the 
difference between market value - debt plus equity - and investor funds since inception). 
Research revealed that even though CEOs are paid quite well, certain performance goals 
or social issues are not adequately addressed. Moreover, gender and ethnicity issues are 
primarily some of the metrics evaluated in determining whether firms are being socially 
responsible. However, women and minorities are still underrepresented in some upper 
level positions and occupants of upper level positions usually determine what is and is 
not tolerated in organizations. 
The top 50 companies for diversity are vastly different from the rest of corporate 
America. The main reason given is diversity in the board room. In comparing the top 50 
companies with Fortune 1,000 companies, the Top 50s board members were 11.3 percent 
black, compared to the national average of 5.6 percent. The Top 50s' board members 
were 10.3 percent Latino, compared to a national average of 1.97 percent. The Top 
50s'board members were 4.3 percent Asian compared to the national average of 1 
percent. The Top 50s' board directors were 20.3 percent women, 35 percent higher than 
the national average of 13.6 percent (Frankel, 2005). In some instances, these people 
have different mindsets and challenge the prevailing way of thinking. According to 
Michael Critelli, CEO/Chairman, Pitney Bowes, women and people of color get away 
from groupthink and pay more attention to moral issues and how the front line people 
feel. In addition, they are more challenging of the orthodox way of thinking and cause 
scandals to be prevented or become serious (Cole, 2005). If this were the general trend, 
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there would possibly be less uproar about CEO compensation and other inequities. In 
general though, the wage gap still exists with women and minorities being paid less than 
their white counterparts. Compounding these problems, CEO compensation has 
skyrocketed while thousands of front line workers and middle level workers are laid off 
or, by their perception, underpaid. 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate social responsibility will be positively related to 
perceived distributive justice of CEO pay. When the firm is investing money in 
CSR, CEO pay will be seen as more fair. 
Individual-Level Variables and Attitudes 
towards CEO Pay 
Equity Sensitivity 
Equity theorists suggest that when people feel that they are improperly or unfairly 
under rewarded for contributions made to the organization relative to others, unpleasant 
feelings result, which normally results in a person's move to reduce it. Different 
conditions produce distress of different qualities; therefore, different behaviors will 
result. Therefore, different equity-restoring responses should be experienced (Adams & 
Freedman, 1976). Some individuals might be moved to restore equity through 
withdrawing effort, complaining, quitting, or pursuing some legal remedy (Robbins & 
Coulter, 2005). However, all individuals do not react the same way when perceived 
inequities exist. Some individuals might not have a choice in not reacting to a perceived 
inequity because opportunities to do so might not exist (or options to respond negatively 
might not exist). Never the less, even if an individual has a choice to restore equity in an 
acceptable way, the individual may or may not be motivated to do so. As a result, equity 
sensitivity theory will help us explain whether or not individuals are "moved" to respond. 
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How individuals respond to perceived inequity could have an impact on individual as 
well as organizational performance. 
Equity theory's distress prediction was based on the assumption that individuals 
are equally sensitive to equity. However, more recent research indicates something to the 
contrary. The equity sensitivity construct suggests that individuals react in consistent but 
individually different ways to both equity and inequity. Three classes of individuals are 
identified along a continuum. They include: (1) Benevolents who prefer their 
outcomes/input ratios to be less than those of their comparative other, (2) Equity 
Sensitives, who prefer their outcome/input ratios to be equal to those of their comparative 
others and, (3) Entitleds, who prefer their outcome/input ratios to be more than those of 
the comparative others. This adds a new dimension to predicting outcomes of relative 
deprivation or inequities in organizations (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985; Huseman, 
Hatfield, & Miles, 1987). 
Huseman's Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI) has been used in many studies 
over the last several years to measure equity sensitivity. With the ESI, ten points are 
allocated to each of five items, and scores on the five items are summed. Respondents 
who score low on all items are labeled Benevolents, and those who score high on all 
items are labeled Entitleds (Shore Sy, & Strauss, 2006) 
However, some authors have suggested that the ESI does not measure equity 
sensitivity (Greenberg, 1990), and an alternative measure developed by Sauley and 
Bedeian (2000) exists. The Equity Preference Questionnaire (EPQ) employes Likert-scale 
responses, not a forced-distribution method (as does the ESI). Thus, comparisons among 
individual respondents are more accurate. Sauley and Bedeian (2000) based their scale on 
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systematic item-development procedures, and demonstrated the strong reliability and 
validity of their measure. 
Hypothesis 5: Equity sensitivity will interact with the organization-level variables 
to predict perceptions about the distributive justice of CEO pay. High equity 
sensitivity of respondents will strengthen the relationship between the 
organizational-level variables and perceptions of CEO pay fairness. 
Demographic variables should be factored into any contemporary study on equity 
sensitivity. Individual behavior has everything to do with the success of organizations. 
There are several instances where employee attitudes might directly or indirectly impact 
the bottom line. First, employees may not feel attached to the firm. Secondly, employees 
might feel disgusted with CEO pay. Thirdly, employees might not feel that they are being 
compensated fairly. Fourthly, they might feel that the firm is socially irresponsible. 
Fifthly, employees might feel that they are underrepresented depending on the makeup of 
the executive management team. They might also feel that they do not have access to top 
management or the connections needed to pursue opportunities for advancement and 
growth. 
Demographic Similarity to CEO 
In addition, an individual's similarity or dissimilarity to the CEO might help 
explain whether or not individuals feel they will be given an objective or fair opportunity 
for career advancement and growth. Social identity theory defines and differentiates 
between individuals who are included in the category of employees that receive these 
"fair" opportunities and those that do not. The ones that are included are referred to as in-
group participants and the ones who are not are considered in the out-group. Never the 
less, pay inequities and under-representation in top management, for all practical 
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purposes are characteristics of individuals in the out-group (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, 
Roefs, & Simons, 1997) 
There is a growing consensus that people who are similar to their CEOs tend to 
fare better in organizations. Much of this phenomenon can be explained by identity 
theory. According to Tajfel (1982) identity refers to common identification with a 
collectivity or social category. Identity theory traces its root to Mead (1934) where his 
framework asserted the formula "Society shapes self shapes social behavior." Identity 
theory has evolved into two somewhat closely related but different strands. The first 
focuses on how social structures affect the structure of self and how the structure of the 
self influences social behavior. The second focuses on the internal dynamics of self-
processes as these affect social behavior (Stryker & Burke, 2000). 
Stryker (1968), consistently with contemporary sociology, suggests that society is 
perceived as a mosaic of patterned interactions and relationships. The relationships are 
differentiated but organized and embedded in an array of groups, organizations, 
communities, and institutions. Moreover, crosscutting boundaries of class, ethnicity, age, 
gender, religion, and other variables intersects these relationships (Stryker & Burke, 
2000). 
Social Identity theory has been proposed by a number of researchers as a means 
by which similarity to others is a meaningful construct (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Tsui, 
Egan, & O'Reilly, 1992). Individuals define themselves in terms of an infinite number of 
groups they belong to such as organizations, religious groups, gender, and age cohorts 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This is referred to as social classification. Social classification 
serves two functions: (1) it cognitively segments and orders the social environment, 
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providing the individual with a systematic means of defining others, and (2) it enables the 
individual to define him or herself. They normally evaluate similar in-group members in 
a more positive manner than dissimilar out-group members. 
Common finding on this topic include the fact that people tend to consistently 
treat members of their own group (in-groups) more favorably than they do members of 
other groups (out-groups) in evaluations or making allocating outcomes (Ellemers et al., 
1997). Social identity theory suggests that cognitive representations of self and of a 
similar or relevant in-group member correspond when in-group identification is 
psychologically salient. Perceived in-group homogeneity is considered by social identity 
theory to be a key cognitive foundation of group behaviors. 
However, recent development of social identity theory has focused on how group 
are differentiated internally with regard to prototypicality. According to Abrams, 
Marques, Brown, and Henson (2002), some members are more prototypical than others, 
relative to differential influence within the group and with processes of leadership and 
marginalizations (Abrams et al, 2000; Yuki, 2004). As a result, social identity theory 
implicates a depersonalized perception of in-group members by viewing them as 
interchangeable (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) or as different 
relative to their prototype-based position in the group. 
Moreover, according to social identity theory, in-groups cannot be defined in 
isolation of out-groups. In-groups are the groups where individuals feel they are a part of 
the influential or connected group. Regardless of status (whether high or low), in-groups 
are characterized as showing extreme favoritism to its members. Therefore, they gain 
their definition from comparison with and contrast to out-groups (Turner, 1975; Yuki, 
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2004). Out-groups are groups that in-group members do not belong to. It appears 
plausible that based on this theory, minorities and women predominantly feel that they 
are, by default, members of the out-group. This conjecture is based on the assumption 
that members of these groups are underrepresented at the CEO level; therefore, less 
possibility exists for them as compared to white males for opportunities for advancement 
and growth within some organizations. According to Hertzberg (1959), a sense of 
achievement, earned recognition, interest in work itself, opportunities for growth and 
advancement were considered motivators. Literature is replete with linkages between 
motivation and performance. This potential challenge illuminates the possibility that 
some organizations might be two time losers. The first potential loss could result from the 
decrease in employee morale that can lead to lower employee performance and 
consequently organizational performance and success. The second loss could result from 
erroneous disregard for potentially high achieving executive candidates. Organizations 
cannot change or influence the entire makeup or characteristics of individual group 
members; however, an understanding of the theory of social identity offers as many 
opportunities as challenges. 
Literature on group identification discusses four relevant principles. First, group 
identification is viewed as a perceptual cognitive construct that requires no specific 
behavior. An individual does not have to put forth effort in pursuit of organizational 
goals. The individual only has to perceive one's self as psychologically intertwined with 
the fate of the group. Secondly, group identification is perceived as personally 
experiencing the successes and failures of the group. Thirdly, group identification refers 
to "self in terms of categories and therefore distinguishable from internalization. Finally, 
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identification with a group is similar to identification with a person (e.g., ones' coach, 
ones' father) (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
Several factors have been identified in the literature of this theory that increase 
tendencies to identify with groups or organizations. First, people will identify with an 
organization because of its distinctiveness in terms of values and practices. Secondly, the 
prestige of the group will influence identification because social identification affects 
self-esteem. Thirdly, identification probably will be associated with the salience of the 
out-groups. Awareness of out-groups reinforces awareness of in-groups. Finally, the 
factors traditionally associated with group formation may affect the extent to which 
individuals identify with a group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
Widely documented findings in social identity suggest that people prefer to 
interact with members of their identity group more so than with members of other groups 
(Tajfel, 1982). It has been speculated that white men's extreme overrepresentation in 
positions of authority may have a negative impact on women and nonwhite subordinates 
(Konrad & Gutek, 1987). This might signal to women and nonwhites that limited 
opportunities for mobility exist for them in the organization (Ely, 1994). In addition, past 
research shows evidence linking demographic attributes such as gender, race, education, 
tenure and family size to absenteeism (Tsui et al., 1992). Other potential biases exist as 
well. Men are more likely than women to believe that parental responsibilities of women 
decrease job performance and provide no future assurance of performance (Lobel & St. 
Clair, 1992). The ranks of CEOs are heavily skewed toward white males. Accordingly, 
women and nonwhites ultimately find themselves in the out-group category. Lost in this 
economic shuffle are women and ethnic minorities who are very rarely represented in top 
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management positions and usually get less than a relatively equitable slice of the 
economic pie for their efforts or contributions to organizations. 
Hypothesis 6: Demographic similarity to CEO pay will interact with the 
organization-level variables to predict perceptions about the distributive justice of 
CEO pay. The positive relationship between organization-level variables and 
perceptions of pay fairness will be strengthened when the respondent and CEO 
are the same race, but will be weakened when they are of different races. 
Respondents' Pay 
Subjects for this study primarily lived in the Southern portion of the U. S. Over 80 
percent lived in Louisiana, with rest of the majority in Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi. 
The median income is not as high as the National average (U. S. Census Bureau). In 
addition, there are very few known Fortune 500 firms in the area that have excessive 
CEO compensation. However, the extensive coverage given to CEO compensation by the 
news media and general outcry against it, make it very unlikely that the respondents do 
not have knowledge of and opinions on the issues. Over 15,000 articles related to CEO 
compensation between 1994 and 2002 were written; however, the negative publicity has 
not led to less compensation (Woyke, 2006). Pfeffer feels that public information about 
CEO pay has sparked an arms race among compensation consultants on behalf of their 
CEO clients. He therefore suggests that the only way to stop the CEO pay boom is to 
cease writing about it (Pfeffer, 2006). 
Census bureau data reveal that per capita income for the year 2003 was $26,312 
for Louisiana, $24,384 for Arkansas, $29,074 for Texas, and $23,466 for Mississippi. 
These four states represented the primary area of concentration for the survey. The 
national level of income per capita for the same year was $31,472. In addition, the 
respondents reported their own pay level on the survey instrument. The pay levels will be 
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established through census data and the resultant low and high levels will used in the 
vignettes. 
Hypothesis 7: Respondents' pay will interact with the organization-level variables 
to predict perceptions about the distributive justice of CEO pay. Higher pay of 
respondents will strengthen the relationship between the organizational-level 
variables and perceptions of CEO pay fairness. Lower pay will weaken the 
relationship between the organization-level variables and perceptions of pay 
fairness. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
This chapter outlines and specifies the methods used in this dissertation. The first 
section provides details on the participants and the procedure used in the study. The 
second section describes the vignettes used in the survey. The third section explains the 
treatment of the constructs. Finally, the data analysis methods employed is covered. 
Participants and Procedure 
The study began with a sample of 598 participants who work in a variety of 
industries, primarily in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi. Students enrolled at 
Grambling State University and Louisiana Tech University, both located in North 
Louisiana, and Wiley Colleges' Shreveport, Louisiana classes contacted the participants. 
A snowball sampling technique was used in upper-level management classes where 
students from all three schools were given three surveys (which included one vignette per 
survey). Two surveys were distributed to two working adults who were not students. The 
student participant filled out the third survey. Respondents were presented with a cover 
letter explaining the purpose of the study and the importance of their participation. 
Participants completed survey items regarding their attitudes toward their own job and 
some demographics, then read the randomly assigned vignettes and completed survey 
items regarding attitudes towards the compensation of the CEO in the vignette. 
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Participants were not informed that there were different vignettes on each survey. 
Surveys were returned to the author in sealed envelopes. All survey responses are 
anonymous. 
Vignettes 
The vignettes in this study are short descriptions of an organization that 
participants are to respond to based on their own feelings. Table 3.1 indicates the 
manipulations in each vignette, and each vignettes used is in Appendix A. In total, there 
were 16 different vignettes, which were randomly distributed in the surveys. 
The vignettes include two different races of CEOs -Black and White. The 
ethnicities of the CEO and respondents were used to get an idea of respondents' attitudes 
toward identity theory or whether they feel that ethnic similarity or dissimilarity to the 
CEO will influence business decisions. The vignettes also included levels of corporate 
profitability, social responsibility, employee pay and the types of products made of by the 
companies. 
CEO pay level was set at a conservative level, but one that was also reasonable 
enough that respondents might have a range of responses to it. A pilot test was 
conducted and through descriptive statistical analysis, it was determined that extreme 
high level of pay would be unreasonable for any CEO. In addition, subjects desired 
information on the size of the firm. 
All organizations in the scenarios make consumer products. Most average 
individuals use these types of products at one time or another. I wanted respondents have 
a general idea about the firm's products before attempting to determine whether they 
would patronize a particular entity. 
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Table 3.1 Manipulations in Vignettes 
Variable 
CEO Ethnicity 
Employee Ethnicity 
Employee Pay 
Organization Performance 
Organization Social Responsibility 
Options 
White 
White 
< 20,000 
Not meeting financial 
goals 
Not investing in 
community, etc. 
Black 
Black 
>40,000 
Meeting financial 
goals 
Making large 
investments in the 
community 
Inclusion of Grambling State University, Louisiana Tech University and Wiley 
College students' in generating the snowball sample resulted in a diverse group of 
participants. Approximately 24 percent of the survey instruments were distributed, 
collected and turned in by Wiley College students. Louisiana Tech students distributed, 
collected, and turned in 36 percent of the instruments and Grambling students distributed, 
collected, and turned in the other 40 percent of the survey instruments. The student 
populations of the participating colleges resulted in expected over-sampling of African 
Americans (56.6%), resulting in a sample that was 36.8 percent White, American Indians, 
Hispanics, and Asians. Though students were not asked to balance the sample between 
men and women, good representation from both groups was achieved. Forty two percent 
of the respondents were male and 57.5 percent of the respondents were female. 
Participants were predominantly from the South. Eighty three percent were from 
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Louisiana, 5.7 percent were from Texas, 2.2 percent were from Arkansas, 1.7 percent was 
from Mississippi, and 7.4 percent were from other states. 
Measures 
The following measures were included on each survey, which contained one of 16 
vignettes. The items from the survey are presented in Appendix B. The correlation 
matrix, along with the means and standard deviations of each of the following measures, 
is shown in Table 3.2. 
Respondent Salary 
Thirty two respondents gave wage information in hourly rates. Therefore, they 
were converted to annual salaries by multiplying the hourly rates by 2,080 hours (40 
hours per week times 52 weeks per year). Descriptive analysis was completed for 
profiling the sample. Some salaries were too low to be considered annual salaries (i.e. 
$2,650), therefore I could not determine whether it was weekly or monthly pay. 
Therefore, these figures were eliminated from the analysis. There were thirteen such 
cases. In one case a salary of $600,000 was given. Since most salaries were fairly low, 
this outlier salary was eliminated as well. Moreover, there were five cases where salary 
ranges were given. In those cases, I entered the lower salary amount. 
Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 18 items of the Pay Satisfaction 
Questionnaire using principal component analysis with varimax rotation (Heneman & 
Schwab, 1985). The items and factors loadings for this scale are presented in Table 3.3. 
The three-factor solution was arrived at based on factor loadings and eigenvalues above 
1.00. The first factor, called Firm Pay Policy had five items of the 18 that loaded heavily 
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on it. The second factor, called My Salary had five items of the 18 items that loaded 
heavily on it. The third factor, called Benefits had four items of the 18 that loaded 
heavily on it. Items 4, 9, and 7 were dropped all together because they did not meet the 
thresh-hole (.50) for retaining. 
The three subscales of Pay Satisfaction were examined for internal reliability by 
computing Cronbach's Alpha for each subscale. As shown in Table 3.2 (on the main 
diagonal) Firm Pay Policy (.88), Benefits (.778), and My Salary (.92) all met the 
minimum requirements for scale reliability. 
Equity Preference Questionnaire 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 15 items of the Equity 
Preference Questionnaire (EPQ) (Sauley & Bedeian, 2000) using principal component 
analysis with varimax rotation. The results of this analysis appear in Table 3.4. The three-
factor solution was arrived at based on factor loadings and eigenvalues above 1.00. The 
factors loaded onto those identified by Foote & Harmon (2006). The entire first factor, 
called Conscientiousness was reverse coded and included 7 items that loaded heavily on 
it. The second factor, called Work Ethic had four items that loaded heavily on it. The 
third factor, called Duty had three items that loaded heavily on it. Only one item was 
dropped from this entire set of questions - because of low loadings. 
The individual factors of EPQ were examined for internal reliability by 
computing Cronbach's Alpha for each. As shown in Table 3.2 (on the main diagonal) 
Conscientiousness (.88), Work Ethic (.78), and Duty (.69) all either met or were very 
close to the minimum requirements for scale reliability. 
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Table 3.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Pay Satisfaction Scale 
Item 
My take-home pay 
My benefit package 
My most recent raise 
Influence my supervisor has on my 
pay* 
My current salary 
Amount the company pays towards 
my benefits 
The raises I have typically received in 
the past* 
The company's pay structure 
Information the company gives about 
pay issues of concern to me 
My overall level of pay 
The value of my benefits 
Pay of other jobs in the company 
Item 
Consistency of the company's pay 
policy 
Size of my current salary 
The number of benefits I receive 
How my raises are determined 
Differences in pay among job in the 
company 
How the company administers pay 
Eigenvalue 
% of Total Variance 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Company Pay 
Policy 
.287 
.130 
.316 
.300 
.181 
.586 
.576 
.396 
.221 
.660 
Company Pay 
Policy 
.740 
.333 
.253 
.656 
.814 
.722 
3.972 
24.826 
.882 
My Salary 
.825 
.303 
.571 
.838 
.178 
.461 
.344 
.799 
.283 
.190 
My Salary 
.310 
.810 
.176 
.319 
.194 
.215 
3.889 
24.306 
.921 
Benefits 
.232 
.822 
.318 
.223 
.857 
.259 
.240 
.223 
.841 
.101 
Benefits 
.117 
.273 
.876 
.208 
.126 
.251 
3.483 
21.771 
.920 
Item did not load adequately and was dropped from further analysis. 
49 
Table 3.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Equity Sensitivity Scale 
Loadings 
Item 
At work, my greatest concern is whether or not I am 
doing the best job I can.* 
A job that requires me to be busy during the day is 
better than a job that allows me a lot of loafing. 
At work, I feel uneasy when there is little work for 
me to do. 
I would become very dissatisfied with my job if I 
had little or no work to do. 
All other things being equal, it is better to have a job 
with a lot of duties and responsibilities than one 
with few duties and responsibilities. 
I am most satisfied at work when I have to do as 
little as possible. 
When I am at my job, I think of ways to get out of 
work. 
If I could get away with it, I would try to work just a 
little bit slower than the boss expects. 
It is really satisfying to me when I can get 
something for nothing at work. 
It is the smart employee who gets as much as s/he 
can while giving as little as possible in return. 
Employees who are more concerned about what 
they can get from their employer rather than what 
they can give to their employer are the wise ones. 
If I had to work hard all day at my job, I would 
probably quit. 
Even if I received low wages and poor benefits from 
my employer, I would still try to do my best at my 
job. 
I feel obligated to do more than I am paid to do at 
work. 
Eigenvalue 
% of Total Variance 
Total Variance 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Factor 1 
Conscientiousness 
-.383 
.006 
-.145 
-.078 
.683 
.799 
.801 
.736 
.746 
.725 
.736 
-.153 
.011 
4.133 
29.525 
.876 
Factor 2 
Work 
Ethic 
.638 
.794 
.795 
.761 
-.307 
-.087 
-.068 
-.131 
-.125 
-.051 
-.003 
.044 
2.477 
17..694 
.778 
Factor 3 
Duty 
.114 
.096 
.125 
.172 
-.080 
-.075 
-.202 
-.045 
.028 
-.073 
-.142 
.813 
.765 
1.889 
13.496 
60.715 
.685 
Item did not load adequately and was dropped from further analysis. 
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Pay Equity 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 14 items of the Pay Equity scale 
using principal component analysis with varimax rotation. The two-factor solution, which 
was arrived at based on factor loadings and Eigenvalues above 1.00, is shown in Table 
3.5. The first factor, called CEO Pay Equity included 7 items that loaded heavily on it. 
The second factor, called Employee Pay Equity had six items that loaded heavily on it. 
Only one item did not meet the threshold and was dropped. 
The individual factors of Pay Equity were examined for internal reliability by 
computing Cronbach's Alpha for each. As shown in Table 3.2 (on the main diagonal) 
CEO Pay Equity (.89) and Employee Pay Equity (.91) both met the minimum 
requirements for scale reliability. 
Company Reputation 
Next exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the seven items of the 
Company Reputation scale using principal component analysis. Only one factor was 
extracted, therefore the solution could not be rotated. The one-factor solution, which was 
arrived at based on factor loadings and eigenvalues above 1.00, is shown in Table 3.6 
also. The factor, called Company Reputation included all 7 items. 
The individual factor of Company Reputation was examined for internal 
reliability by computing Cronbach's Alpha. As shown in Table 3.2 (on the main 
diagonal), reliability testing resulted in an alpha of .87, which met the minimum 
requirements for scale reliability. 
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Table 3.5 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Pay Equity Items 
Item 
I think that the level of pay of the CEO of R Company is 
fair. 
I think that if the CEO of R Company performs well, 
there is an appropriate reward for him. 
I think that the bonus opportunity for the CEO of R 
Company is fair. 
Taking into account the responsibilities he has, the pay 
of the CEO of R Company is fair. 
Taking into account the amount of education and 
training he has, the pay of the CEO of R Company is 
fair. 
Taking into account the amount of effort he puts forth, 
the pay of the CEO of R Company is fair. 
Taking into account the stresses and strains of the job, 
the pay of the CEO of R Company is fair. 
I think that the level of pay of the employee of R 
Company is fair. 
I think that if the CEO of R Company performs well, 
there is an appropriate reward for him.* 
I think that the salary adjustment for the employees of R 
Company is fair.* 
Taking into account the responsibilities they have, the 
pay of the employees of R Company is fair. 
Taking into account the amount of education and 
training they have, the pay of the employees of R 
Company is fair. 
Taking into account the amount of effort they put forth, 
the pay of the employees of R Company is fair. 
Taking into account the stresses and strains of the jobs, 
the pay of the employees of R Company is fair. 
Eigenvalue 
% of Total Variance 
Total Variance 
Cronbach's Alpha 
CEO Pay 
Equity 
.721 
.651 
.670 
.817 
.776 
.805 
.825 
.256 
.190 
.222 
.224 
.208 
4.233 
35.277 
.89 
Employee Pay 
Equity 
.296 
.058 
.223 
.282 
.198 
.226 
.202 
.741 
.877 
.827 
.869 
.863 
3.853 
32.107 
67.384 
.92 
*Item did not load adequately and was dropped from further analysis. 
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Table 3.6 Factor Analysis of Company Reputation Scale 
Item 
I would be proud to be an employee of R Company. 
R Company has a good reputation in the community. 
I have a great deal of interest in R Company and its future. 
R Company is a good company to work for. 
People take pride in the quality of work done at R Company. 
I would not hesitate to purchase products made by R 
Company. 
R Company gives back to society through nonprofits and 
worthwhile causes 
Eigenvalue 
% of Variance 
Total Variance 
Cornbach's Alpha 
Company Reputation 
.792 
.784 
.775 
.816 
.681 
.680 
.725 
3.958 
56.549 
56.549 
.87 
CEO Reputation 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 11 items of the CEO Reputation 
scale using principal component analysis. Only one factor was extracted, therefore the 
solution could not be rotated. The one-factor solution was arrived at based on factor 
loadings and Eigenvalues above 1.00. The factor, called CEO Reputation included 7 
items. Items 5, 9, and 10 did not meet the threshold for factor loading and were dropped. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.7. 
The individual factor of CEO Reputation was examined for internal reliability by 
computing Cronbach's Alpha. As shown in Table 3.2 (on the main diagonal), reliability 
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testing resulted in an alpha of .86, which met the minimum requirements for scale 
reliability. 
After confirmatory factor analysis was completed, organizational level control 
variables were identified (profit, social, employee pay, and job titles). Job titles of 
respondents were compressed into eleven industrial categories using a Human Resources 
Manual: (1) Administration, Management and Clerical, (2) Manufacturing and Labor, (3) 
Education, (4) Officer (Police, Military, or Security Guard), (5) Sales, (6) Health, (7) 
Cook, (8) Accounting, (10) Technical and Trade, and (11) Other Jobs. A frequency 
distribution was completed and it revealed that 206 respondents fit the Administration, 
Management, and Clerical category. Thirty fit the Manufacturing and Labor category, 
and 46 fit the Education category. The rest of the respondents fit the Officer category (6), 
the Sales category (72), the Health category (35), the Cook category (12), the Accounting 
category (27), the Trade and Tech category (25) and Other Jobs category (111), 
respectively. The Other Jobs category included jobs where only one or two respondents 
chose that job category where the job titles were not traditional. In addition, several job 
titles were given by acronyms and the actual job content could not be determined. Those 
were also coded as "other jobs." These job titles are individual level variables and are 
included to help describe the sample. 
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Table 3.7 Exploratory Factor Analysis of CEO Reputation Scale 
Item 
The CEO of R Company tries to maintain good morale 
The CEO of R Company ensures that effective support systems are in 
place to benefit all stakeholders 
The CEO of R Company gives credit and praise for a job well done 
The CEO of R Company is fair 
The CEO of R Company is fairly compensated for what he does for the 
company 
The CEO of R Company ensures that diversity management is practiced 
The CEO ofR Company ensures that all employees, regardless of gender 
or ethnicity are treated fairly 
The CEO of R Company is underpaid for his performance and 
contributions 
The CEO of R Company is overpaid for his performance and 
contributions * 
The CEO of R Company's pay does not impact the morale of workers * 
The CEO of R Company is interested in the welfare of employees 
Eigenvalue 
% of Total Variation 
Total Variation 
Cornbach's Alpha 
CEO 
Reputation 
.758 
.594 
.808 
.810 
.511 
.747 
.719 
.500 
.796 
4.456 
49.517 
49.517 
.859 
Item did not load adequately and was dropped from further analysis. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis Testing 
Statistical analysis was used to test all seven hypotheses. The first hypothesis was 
tested using correlation analysis. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 were tested using t-tests, which 
are the mathematical equivalent to simple regression analysis and one-way ANOVA. 
Hypotheses 5 through 7 were tested using moderated regression. Tables of all hypotheses 
tests are included in the appendices. Control variables such as organization size, number 
of years of experience for employees as well as job title were proposed. However, the 
pilot test results were used in setting all firms up as large firms in the vignettes. In 
addition, I did not find significant relationships as hypothesized. Therefore, neither non 
spurious results nor non significant relationships required entering control variables to 
test a joint effect. 
Correlation Analysis 
The first hypothesis stated that Perceived Distributive Justice of CEO Pay 
(CeoPayEq) will be positively related to Perceived Prestige (reputation) of the Firm. If 
CEO pay is seen as fair, the reputation of the firm will also be seen as good. If CEO pay 
is seen as unfair, the reputation of the firm will not be considered as good. Results of 
correlation analysis performed to test Hypothesis 1 indicated that there was a 
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significant relationship between CEO Pay Equity and the Reputation of the Firm; r = 
.437, p < .05, as seen in Table 3.2. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
T-Tests 
Results oft-test analyses are in Table 4.1. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the level of 
Employee Pay in the vignette would be positively related to Perceived Distributive 
Justice of CEO Pay such that when employees receive high pay, high CEO Pay would be 
seen as more fair. Using the t-test to test this hypothesis, I predicted that there will be 
differences in perceptions of CEO Pay Equity for the different vignettes depending on 
whether employees in the scenario company receive high pay ($40,000) versus low pay 
($20,000). The results of the analysis indicate that respondents who read vignettes in 
which the scenario company had higher pay reported a higher perception of CEO pay 
equity (M = 2.7709, SD = .71362) than did those who read vignettes in which employees 
received low pay (M = 2.4940, SD = .77085), t (583) = -.4.498, p = .000. Hypothesis 2 
was supported. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that respondents' perceptions of firm performance of R 
Company in the vignette would be positively related to the Perceived Distributive Justice 
of CEO Pay. I predicted that there would be differences in perceptions distributive 
justice of CEO pay depending on whether the company is seen as profitable or not 
profitable. Results of the T-Tests revealed that perceptions of firm profitability are not 
related to distributive justice of CEO pay, (Two Sample, t = .668, p = .504). Hypothesis 3 
was therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that corporate social responsibility (from the vignettes), as 
perceived by respondents, would be positively related to the distributive justice of CEO 
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pay. CEO pay at socially responsible firms would be recognized as more justified than 
CEO Pay at firms that are not socially responsible. Using the t-test to test this 
Hypothesis, I predicted that there would be differences in perceptions of CEO Pay Equity 
exhibited when firms are described as socially responsible versus when firms are 
described as not socially responsible. Results of the analysis revealed that perceptions of 
distributive justice of CEO pay were not related to the social responsibility manipulation 
presented in the vignettes, (Two Sample, t =-.796, p = .427). Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported. 
Table 4.1 T-Test Results for Hypotheses 2, 3, & 4 
Dependent Variable: CEO Pay Equity 
Mean 
S.D. 
Observations 
Mean 
Difference 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
P 
t 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
Vignette Condition 
Low 
Employee 
Pay 
2.4940 
.77085 
303 
-.27683 
583 
.000 
-4.498 
High 
Employee 
Pay 
2.7709 
.71362 
282 
-.27683 
583 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
Vignette Condition 
Profitable 
2.6480 
.73549 
287 
.04178 
583 
.504 
.668 
Un-profitable 
2.6062 
.77736 
298 
.04178 
583 
HYPOTHESIS 4 
Vignette Condition 
Socially 
Responsible 
2.6521 
.77123 
295 
-.04976 
563 
.427 
-.796 
Not 
Socially 
Responsibl 
e 
2.6024 
.74112 
290 
-.04976 
583 
Note. Two sample assuming equal variances 
58 
Moderated Regression Analysis 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that Equity Sensitivity would interact with the 
organizational level variables (as presented in the vignettes) of Profitability, Social 
Responsibility, and Employee Pay to predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of 
CEO Pay. Exploratory Factor Analysis performed prior to hypothesis testing resulted in 
the extraction of three components of Equity Sensitivity: (1) Conscientiousness, (2) Work 
Ethic, and (3) Duty, consistent with Foote & Harmon, (2006). Therefore, interactions 
were tested through moderated regression using all three components of Equity 
Sensitivity and the three organizational level variables: (1) Employee Pay, (2) 
Profitability and (3) Social Responsibility. Hypothesis 5 was expanded to include all 
nine tests (three components of equity sensitivity multiplied by the three organizational 
level variables); results of these moderated regressions are presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.4. Moderated Regression Analysis yielded mixed results. The first test of 
interaction included Conscientiousness and Employee pay. In support of Hypothesis 5, 
which stated that Equity Sensitivity would interact with organizational level variables to 
predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay, interaction between 
Conscientiousness and Employee pay was significant, F = 16.824, p< .01. The change in 
R was .025. The second test of interaction included Conscientiousness and Profit. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that Conscientiousness would interact with organizational 
Profitability to predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. Moderated 
Regression yielded results that were non-significant, F (1, 579) = 2.299, p = .13. 
59 
Table 4.2 Moderated Regression Results for Hypothesis 5 Using 
Conscientiousness Dimension of Equity Sensitivity 
Hypothesis 
H5 
H5a 
H5b 
H5c 
Regression Steps 
DV: CEO Pay Equity 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Conscientiousness 
Employee Pay 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Consc X Ee Pay) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Conscientiousness 
Profit 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Consc X Profit) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Conscientiousness 
Social 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Consc X Social) 
P 
-.149 
.176 
.849 
-.156 
-.035 
-.333 
-.153 
.028 
-.323 
R2 
.055 
.080 
.025 
.029 
.025 
.028 
AR2 
.025 
.004 
.004 
F-Statistic 
16.884 
16.824 
7.499 
5.777 
7.358 
5.625 
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Table 4.3 Moderated Regression Results for Hypothesis 5 Using 
Work Ethic Dimension of Equity Sensitivity 
Hypothesis 
H5 
H5d 
H5e 
H5f 
Regression Steps 
DV: CEO Pay 
Equity 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Work Ethic 
Employee Pay 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Workethi X Ee Pay) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Work Ethic 
Profit 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Workethi X Profit) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Work Ethic 
Social 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Workethi X Social) 
P 
-.004 
.182 
.231 
-.009 
-.030 
.217 
-.009 
.035 
.213 
R2 
.033 
.036 
.001 
.003 
.001 
.003 
AR2 
.003 
.002 
.002 
F-Statistic 
9.893 
7.103 
.280 
.605 
.381 
.661 
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Table 4.4 Moderated Regression Results for Hypothesis 5 Using 
Duty Dimension of Equity Sensitivity 
Hypothesis 
H5 
H5g 
H5h 
H5i 
Regression Steps 
DV: CEO Pay 
Equity 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Duty 
Employee Pay 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Duty X Ee Pay) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Duty 
Profit 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Duty X Profit) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Duty 
Social 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Duty X Social) 
P 
.020 
.182 
-.063 
.005 
-.032 
.115 
.004 
.033 
-.021 
R2 
.033 
.033 
.001 
.002 
.001 
.001 
AR2 
.000 
.001 
.000 
F-Statistic 
9.753 
6.534 
.308 
.331 
.320 
.217 
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The third test of interaction included Conscientiousness and Social Responsibility. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that Conscientiousness would interact with a firm's Social 
Responsibility to predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. Moderated 
Regression yielded results that were non-significant, F (1, 579) = 2.129, p = .145. 
The fourth test of interaction included Work Ethic and Employee Pay. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that Work Ethic would interact with Employee Pay to predict 
Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was non-
significant, F (1, 578) = 1.507, p = .22 
The fifth test of interaction included Work Ethic and Profit. Hypothesis 5 
predicted that Work Ethic would interact with Profitability to predict Perceptions about 
Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was non-significant, F (1, 578) = 
1.254,p = .263. 
The sixth test of interaction included Work Ethic and Social Responsibility. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that Work Ethic would also interact with Social Responsibility to 
predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was 
non-significant, F (1, 578) = 1.220, p = .27. 
The seventh test of interaction included Duty and Employee Pay. Hypothesis 5 
predicted that Duty would interact with Employee Pay to predict Perceptions about 
Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was non-significant, F (1, 579) = 
.125,p = .724. 
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The eighth test of interaction included Duty and Profit. Hypothesis 5 predicted 
that Duty would interact with Profitability to predict Perceptions about Distributive 
Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was non-significant, F (1, 576) = .380, p = 
.538. 
The ninth test of interaction included Duty and Social Responsibility. Hypothesis 
5 predicted that Duty would interact with Social Responsibility to predict Perceptions 
about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The interaction effect was non-significant, F (1, 
576) = .012, p = .912. Consequently, there was very limited support for Hypothesis 5, 
which predicted that Equity Sensitivity would interact with organizational level variables 
to predict Perceptions about Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. Only one of the 9 
interactions was significant and could possibly be due to chance. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that Demographic Similarity of CEO in the vignette with 
the respondent would interact with organization-level variables presented in the vignettes 
such as Profit, Social Responsibility, and Employee Pay, to predict perceptions about 
Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. The positive relationship between organization-level 
variables and perceptions of pay fairness was expected to be strengthened when the 
respondent and CEO are of the same race, but will be weakened when they are of 
different races. The race of the CEO in the vignette was given as either Black or White. 
Race was also entered as a dummy variable where 1 represented that the CEO under 
study was Black and 0 represented that the CEO under study was White. The same 
coding system was used for respondents' race also. To test Hypothesis 6, moderated 
regression analysis was used. Interactions between demographic similarity to the CEO 
and the three organization-level variables, Employee Pay, Profitability, and Social 
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Responsibility were tested. Using Perceptions of Distributive Justice of CEO Pay as the 
dependent variable, the first interaction tested included Demographic Similarity to the 
CEO and Employee Pay. As presented in Table 4.5, the interaction was non-significant, F 
(1, 541) = .547, p = .46. The second test for interaction included Demographic Similarity 
to the CEO and Profit. This interaction was non-significant also, F (1, 541) = .28, p = 
.597. The third test for interaction included Demographic Similarity to the CEO and 
Social Responsibility. The interaction was also non-significant, F (1, 541) =.080, p = 
.777. Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that Respondents' Pay would interact with organizational-
level variables in the vignettes (Profitability, Social Responsibility, and Employee Pay) to 
predict Perceptions about the Distributive Justice of CEO Pay. Higher levels of 
respondents' pay were expected to strengthen the relationship between organization-level 
variables and perceptions of CEO pay fairness. Lower respondent pay was expected to 
weaken the relationship between the organization-level variables and perceptions of pay 
fairness. Moderated regression analysis was used and CEO Pay Equity was the dependent 
variable. The first interaction test included Respondent Salary and Employee Pay. The 
interaction effect was non-significant, F (1, 475) = .064, p = .800. The second interaction 
test included Respondent Salary and Profitability. The interaction effect was non-
significant, F (1, 475) = .251, p = .616. The third and final test for interaction included 
Respondent Salary and Social Responsibility. The interaction effect was non-significant, 
F (1, 475) = 1.5, p = .221. The results of these analyses, which are presented in Table 4.6, 
indicate that Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
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Table 4.5 Moderated Regression Results for Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 
H6 
H6a 
H6b 
H6c 
Regression Steps 
DV: CEO Pay 
Equity 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Employee Pay 
Race Similarity 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(E e Pay X Racesim) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Profit 
Race Similarity 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Racesim X Profit) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Social 
Racesim 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Racesim X Social) 
P 
.187 
.064 
.053 
-.042 
.025 
.040 
.023 
.025 
.021 
R2 
.035 
.036 
.002 
.003 
.001 
.001 
AR2 
.001 
.001 
.000 
F-Statistic 
9.946 
6.807 
.640 
.520 
..309 
.232 
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Table 4.6 Moderated Regression Results for Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 
H7 
H7a 
H7b 
Regression Steps 
DV: CEO Pay 
Equity 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Salary 
Employee Pay 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Salary X E e Pay) 
Step 1: Direct Effect 
Salary 
Profit 
Step 2: Interaction 
Term 
(Salary X Profit) 
P 
-.010 
.169 
.-.021 
-.022 
-.026 
.036 
R2 
.029 
.029 
.001 
.001 
AR2 
.000 
.000 
F-Statistic 
6.985 
4.669 
.173 
.199 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
There is very little empirical research regarding employee attitudes towards CEO 
compensation. This study used a fictional company where four organizational variables 
(CEO race, firm profitability, corporate social responsibility, and employee pay) were 
manipulated. Responses were gathered and analyzed. 
Respondents' attitudes toward the distributive justice of CEO pay were measured 
in relation to information contained in vignettes (Employee Pay, CEO Pay, Firm 
Profitability, CEO Race, and Corporate Social Responsibility). CEO pay was held 
constant at $200,000. Hypothesized relationships suggested that perceptions of 
distributive justice of CEO pay would be linked to three independent factors: (1) whether 
employees in the vignettes were paid well, (2) whether the firm was profitable, and (3) 
whether the firm in the vignette was socially responsible. Interactions between the 
organization level variables were also proposed between: (1) equity sensitivity, (2) 
respondent pay, and (3) demographic similarity of the CEO. The hypotheses were each 
tested individually. 
The first hypothesis stated that a respondents' perceived distributive justice of 
CEO pay is positively related to perceived prestige (reputation) of the firm. If CEO pay 
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is seen as fair, the reputation of the firm will also be seen as good. If CEO pay is seen as 
unfair, the reputation of the firm will not be considered to be good. 
Perceived prestige matters because if employees perceive that people external to 
the organization hold their firms in high esteem, they become attached to the 
organization. If workers feel this way, they might relish being part of a well-regarded 
firm (March & Simon, 1958). However, if internal corporate problems related to equity 
or social issues occur, a damaged corporate image cab result and employees will feel less 
attached to their organization. 
Perceived External Prestige (PEP) answers the question "what do outsiders think 
of me because I belong to this organization" or "what is the social value of organizational 
membership" (Dutton et al., 1994). This first hypothesis was tested to answer the more 
important and persistent question: is there a positive relationship between Perceived 
External Prestige and Perceived Distributive Justice of CEO Pay? If the outside image of 
the firm was negative, high CEO Pay would have been expected to be unfair. On the 
other hand, if the image of the firm had been found to be positive, CEO Pay would have 
been seen as fair. 
Results of correlation analysis performed to test the first hypothesis indicate that 
respondents, who believed CEO Pay was fair, felt that the reputation of the firm was 
more positive. The relationship between Employee Pay in the vignette and CEO Pay was 
studied next. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the level of Employee Pay in the vignette would be 
positively related to respondents' perceived distributive justice of CEO Pay such that 
when employees receive high pay, CEO Pay would be seen as more fair. When 
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Employee Pay was low, respondents considered high CEO Pay as unfair. A t-test tested 
this hypothesis; the prediction that there would be differences in perceptions of CEO Pay 
Equity for vignettes in which employees who receive high pay ($40,000) versus low pay 
($20,000) was supported. The results of the analysis indicated that respondents who read 
vignettes in which R Company employees had higher pay reported a higher mean pay 
fairness score (M = 2.7709, SD = .71362) than did those who read vignettes in which 
employees had low pay (M = 2.4940, SD = .77085), t (583) = -.4.498, p < 01. 
Conventional belief in determining CEO compensation is that a correlation exists 
between compensation and company performance. Several studies relating CEO Pay to 
organizational performance have been conducted. Some have found there to be a positive 
relationship between pay and financial performance (Tai, 2004). Tosi, Werner, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, (2000), found that only a small percentage of variation in CEO 
compensation could be explained by a change in financial performance. However, others 
have found pay to be out of line with performance (Bachelder, 2005). As a matter of fact, 
CEO Pay often rises while business falls off and layoffs occur. Iyergar (2002) reported 
studies that showed managers' compensation being largely unaffected when firms 
performed poorly. Consequently, there is no consensus in the research for the common 
belief that CEO Pay is related to company performance. 
Regardless of the relationship between pay and performance, when the firm is 
performing well, respondents are more likely to believe that high CEO Pay is fair. 
According to Walters et al. (1995), high pay is perceived as fair when pay is linked to 
organizational performance. Conventional belief in determining CEO compensation is 
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that a correlation exists between compensation and company performance. Current 
research does not support such a correlation. 
In Hypothesis 3,1 predicted that respondents' perceptions of firm performance of 
R Company in the vignette would be positively related to the perceived distributive 
justice of CEO Pay. My prediction that there would be differences in perceptions of CEO 
Pay equity exhibited depending on whether the company was seen as profitable or not 
profitable was not supported. Results of the t-tests revealed that perceptions of firm 
profitability are not related to perceived fairness of CEO Pay. 
Corporate Social Responsibility is the concern businesses have for society 
(Nickels, et al., 2005). It seems plausible that a conscientious CEO will encourage or 
influence his or her firm to be socially responsible. In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that 
corporate social responsibility, as perceived by respondents reading the vignettes, would 
be positively related to the perceived distributive justice of the CEO. High CEO Pay at 
socially responsible firms would be recognized as more justified than high CEO Pay at 
firms that are not socially responsible. Using the t-test to test this hypothesis, I predicted 
that there would be differences in perceptions of CEO Pay equity exhibited when firms 
are socially responsible and when firms are not socially responsible. It seems plausible to 
expect CEO Pay to be seen as fair when firms are perceived as moral agents and the 
opposite to occur when firms are not perceived as strong moral agents. However, results 
of the analysis revealed that perception of CEO Pay equity was not related to the social 
responsibility presented in the vignettes. 
71 
The next test was related to equity theory. When inequities are perceived, relative 
deprivation exists and leads to dissatisfaction. Relative deprivation is the violations of 
expectations about fair pay outcome. Relative deprivation raises a question about 
distributive justice or fair rewards for effort (Adams, 1965). For Hypothesis 5, I used 
moderated regression to examine the interaction between respondents' equity sensitivity 
and the organizational level variables (employee pay, profit, and social responsibility) to 
predict perceptions about CEO Pay Equity. Exploratory factor analysis performed prior 
to hypothesis testing resulted in the extraction of three components of equity sensitivity: 
(1) conscientiousness, (2) work ethic, and (3) duty, consistent with Foote & Harmon, 
(2006). Therefore, interactions were tested through moderated regression using all three 
components of equity sensitivity and the three organizational level variables: (1) 
employee pay, (2) profitability and (3) social responsibility. Hypothesis 5 was expanded 
to include all nine tests (three components of equity sensitivity multiplied by the three 
organizational level variables). Moderated regression analysis yielded mixed results. Of 
the nine tests of interactions conducted through moderated regression analysis only one 
supported Hypothesis 5. All nine tests results follow. The first test of interaction included 
conscientiousness and employee pay. In support of Hypothesis 5, which stated that equity 
sensitivity would interact with organizational level variables to predict perceptions about 
distributive justice of CEO pay, interaction between conscientiousness and employee pay 
was significant. The second test of interaction included conscientiousness and profit. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that conscientiousness would interact with organizational 
profitability to predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO pay. The results 
were non-significant. 
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The third test of interaction included conscientiousness and social responsibility. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that conscientiousness would interact with a firm's social 
responsibility to predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO pay. Moderated 
regression yielded results that were non-significant. The fourth test of interaction 
included work ethic and employee pay. Hypothesis 5 predicted that work ethic would 
interact with employee pay to predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO pay. 
The interaction effect was non-significant. 
The fifth test of interaction included work ethic and profit. Hypothesis 5 
predicted that work ethic would interact with profitability to predict perceptions about 
distributive justice of CEO pay. The interaction effect was non-significant. 
The sixth test of interaction included work ethic and social responsibility. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that work ethic would also interact with social responsibility to 
predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO pay. The interaction effect was 
non-significant. The seventh test of interaction included duty and employee pay. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that duty would interact with employee pay to predict perceptions 
about distributive justice of CEO pay. The interaction effect was non-significant. The 
eighth test of interaction included duty and profit. Hypothesis 5 predicted that duty 
would interact with profitability to predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO 
pay. The interaction effect was non-significant. The ninth test of interaction included 
duty and social responsibility. Hypothesis 5 predicted that duty would interact with 
social responsibility to predict perceptions about distributive justice of CEO pay. The 
interaction effect was non-significant. 
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The next analysis was grounded in Identity Theory. Social identity theory 
differentiates between individuals who are included in the category of employees that 
receive "fair" opportunities and those that do not (Ellemers et al., 1997). The ones who 
are included are referred to as in-group participants and the ones who are not included are 
considered in the out-group. Generally speaking pay inequities and under-representation 
in top management, characterize individuals in both groups. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that demographic similarity of the CEO in the vignette and 
the respondent would interact with organization-level variables presented in the vignettes 
such as profit, social responsibility, and employee pay, to predict perceptions about 
distributive justice of CEO pay. The positive relationship between organization-level 
variables and perceptions of pay fairness will be strengthened when the respondent and 
CEO are of the same race, but will be weakened when they are of different races. If the 
respondent was of a certain race and the CEO was of that same race, I predicted that the 
positive relationship between the organization level variables and the perception of CEO 
Pay Equity would be stronger than if the respondents and CEOs' race was different. The 
race of the CEO in the vignette was given as either Black or White. Race was also 
entered as a dummy variable where 1 represented that the CEO under study was Black 
and 0 represented that the CEO under study was White. The same coding system was 
used for respondents' race also. To test Hypothesis 6, moderated regression analysis was 
used. Interactions between demographic similarity of the CEO and the three 
organization-level variables, employee pay, profitability, and social responsibility were 
tested. Using perceptions of distributive justice of CEO pay as the dependent variable, 
the first interaction tested included demographic similarity to the CEO and employee pay. 
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The interaction was non-significant. The second test for interaction included 
demographic similarity of the CEO and profit. This interaction was non-significant also. 
The third test for interaction included demographic similarity of the CEO and social 
responsibility. The interaction was non significant. Demographic similarity with the 
CEO did not interact with either organizational level variable. 
The final test focused on the respondents' pay in their current jobs and 
organizational level variables in the vignettes. The respondents were primarily from 
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. Louisiana and Arkansas have much lower salaries than 
the National average (U. S. Census, 2006). In addition, there are very few known Fortune 
500 firms in the area that have excessive CEO compensation. Hypothesis 7 predicted that 
respondents' own pay would interact with organizational level variables in the vignettes 
(profitability, social Responsibility, and Employee Pay) to predict perceptions about the 
distributive justice of CEO pay. Moderated regression analysis was used and perceived 
distributive justice of CEO pay was the dependent variable. The first interaction test 
included respondent salary and employee pay (from the vignette). The interaction effect 
was non-significant. The second interaction test included respondent salary and 
profitability (from the vignette). The interaction effect was non-significant. The third and 
final test for interaction included respondent salary and social responsibility (from the 
vignettes). The interaction effect was non-significant. As a result, the there was no 
statistical relationship between the interaction terms and the dependent variable, 
perceptions of distributive justice CEO pay. Therefore, I concluded that respondent salary 
did not interact with the organization level variables to predict perceptions about 
distributive justice of CEO pay. 
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This study yielded mixed results overall. First there were significant results from 
Hypothesis 1 and 2. In Hypothesis 1 there was a positive relationship between perception 
of distributive justice of CEO pay and the reputation of the firm. In Hypothesis 2 there 
was also a positive relationship between employee pay and perceptions of distributive 
justice of CEO pay. There were also partial results from Hypothesis 5. There was a 
significant relationship between conscientiousness (equity sensitivity) and employee pay. 
The rest of the results were non-significant. Moreover, there were also some limitations 
to highlight. 
Limitations 
This study was confined to a three-state Southern sample. Employee pay in 
Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas is significantly less than the national average. In addition, 
this sample was not representative of a larger region of the United States or of the country 
as a whole. If there had been a larger sample, I would have used U. S. Census data from a 
larger geographical area to establish employee pay levels in the vignettes. As a result, I 
would have expected the relationships to be more positive or stronger because better 
employee pay in the vignettes as well as better respondent pay in other regions of the 
country possibly may have a more significant impact on perceptions of CEO pay fairness. 
Another limitation is that I used vignettes and manipulated only four variables: (1) 
CEO race, (2) employee pay, (3) profit, and (4) social responsibility. As diverse as the 
American society is, (large segment of the U.S. workforce is female and ethnic 
minorities), we used only two races of CEOs. The use of only Black and White CEOs in 
the vignettes reduced the generalizability of these findings. The same concerns exist for 
employee and CEO gender. 
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The manipulation of only four variables also eliminated the real possibility of 
examining the effects of employee, respondent, or CEO gender on perceptions of 
distributive justice of CEO pay. Therefore, a real company, inclusive of additional 
diverse factors, possibly would have yielded different results on perceptions of 
distributive justice of CEO pay. 
The next limitation is that the scenarios in the vignettes were from fictitious 
companies. Respondents were informed that the company and situations were fictitious. 
There is a possibility that the whole outcome would have been different if the firm had 
been an actual organization. 
Finally, predominantly business students were used in the study. My belief is that 
one of the reasons students major in business (aside from the challenge, interest, etc.) is 
to reap substantial monetary rewards from a successful career. The position of CEO is an 
attractive goal for many business students. Therefore, they not only see CEO pay as 
being fair, but a strong motivator as well. I anticipate that if students from other 
disciplines (such as liberal arts or education) had participated in the study, the outcomes 
would have been different and they would have had more concerns about CEO pay equity 
than business students, who in so many ways could be called "CEOs in training" more so 
than students in other disciplines. In light of the limitations, there are opportunities for 
future research. 
Future Research 
This study can be expanded to include a regional or national sample. In addition, 
the study of a more diverse sample might generate more significant results. Moreover, 
the cultural differences as well as pay differences that exist between the different 
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geographical regions could be studied to gain more insight on the impact of these 
differences on respondents' perceptions of CEO pay fairness. 
Another expansion of this study should include additional races of CEOs (other 
than Black and White) such as Hispanic, Asian, or Native American. Inclusion of other 
race CEOs combined with the makeup of a national sample would afford the opportunity 
to refine our hypothesis derived from Identity Theory. Moreover, gender of employees in 
the vignettes as well as the CEOs in the vignettes could be manipulated to gain more 
insight on the impact of these changes on respondents' perceptions of CEO pay fairness. 
In addition, students from liberal arts or education could serve as participants in a 
similar study. They might provide a different perspective from business students who 
might predominantly aspire to be a CEO one day. Comparisons could be made to see if 
differences exist in perceptions of CEO pay equity across or within academic disciplines. 
Implications for Managers 
Managers or organizations might be better served if variables that influence the 
organizations external image are visited. Employees and consumers alike are attracted to 
firms that have a strong or positive image. Moreover, management actions are likely to 
be more acceptable if the firm is perceived as having a positive image. In addition, the 
fair treatment of employees, still play a major role in how employees perceive managers 
and organizations. When employees are paid well, perceptions are usually more positive 
about firms and their actions. In the case of high performing individuals (employees as 
well as prospective employees), organizational attachment is beneficial for the firm. 
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Conclusion 
CEO pay has been and still is a much debated topic. This project evaluated 
"Attitudes Related to CEO Pay." Well established theories served as the basis for the 
hypothesized relationships. Test results showed that there are significant relationships 
between the Perceptions of CEO Pay Equity and variables studied (Organization Prestige 
and Employee Pay). In addition, a factor of the equity sensitivity construct, 
conscientiousness, interacted with employee pay to predict perceptions about CEO pay. 
Even though some of the hypothesized relationships were not supported, limitations as 
well as suggestions for further research make this project a plausible framework to 
expand on. Finally, the managerial implications related to retention of employees, the 
attractiveness of the organization to prospective employees, as well as the fair treatment 
of employees add support to this prevailing philosophy. 
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Vignettes 
Bolded words indicate manipulations in each vignette. 
Vignette #1A 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. The established social goals have 
also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in which 
it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert Smith (a 
black male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including 
a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R 
Company earn approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
Vignette #1B 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to the 
communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. The established social goals have 
also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in which 
it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert Smith (a 
white male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a 
$10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R 
Company earn approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing 
or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary 
adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern 
U.S. 
81 
Vignette #1C 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. The established social goals have 
also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in which 
it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert Smith (a 
black male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including 
a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R 
Company earn approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
Vignette #1D 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. The established social goals have 
also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in which 
it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert Smith (a 
white male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including 
a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R 
Company earn approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
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Vignette #2A 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. The established social goals 
have also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in 
which it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert 
Smith (a black male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, 
including a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees 
in R Company earn approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
Vignette #2B 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. The established social goals 
have also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in 
which it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert 
Smith (a white male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, 
including a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees 
in R Company earn approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
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Vignette #2C 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. The established social goals 
have also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in 
which it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert 
Smith (a black male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, 
including a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees 
in R Company earn approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
Vignette #2D 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. The established social goals 
have also been met; the firm has invested in several of the smaller communities in 
which it has production locations, helping these towns grow and develop. Albert 
Smith (a white male) is the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, 
including a $10,000 bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees 
in R Company earn approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-
sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living 
salary adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
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Vignette #3A 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. Despite its financial status, the R 
Company has not contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has 
not helped to make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a black male) is the 
CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus 
each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn 
approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus 
opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary 
adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern 
U.S. 
Vignette #3B 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. Despite its financial status, the R 
Company has not contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has 
not helped to make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a white male) is the 
CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus 
each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn 
approximately $20,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus 
opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary 
adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern 
U.S. 
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Vignette #3C 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. Despite its financial status, the R 
Company has not contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has 
not helped to make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a black male) is the 
CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus 
each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn 
approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus 
opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary 
adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern 
U.S. 
Vignette #3D 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride 
in three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing 
to the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has met its profit goals for the last three years, and 
stockholders have been happy with their returns. Despite its financial status, the 
R Company has not contributed to the communities in which it has locations and 
has not helped to make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a white male) is 
the CEO of the firm and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 
bonus each year that the firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn 
approximately $40,000 per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus 
opportunities. Typically, employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary 
adjustment each year; nearly all employees live in small low-cost towns in the 
southern U.S. 
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Vignette #4A 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. Also, the R Company has not 
contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has not helped to 
make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a black male) is the CEO of the firm 
and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus each year that the 
firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn approximately $20,000 
per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, 
employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary adjustment each year; nearly all 
employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern U.S. 
Vignette #4B 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. Also, the R Company has not 
contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has not helped to 
make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a white male) is the CEO of the firm 
and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus each year that the 
firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn approximately $20,000 
per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, 
employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary adjustment each year; nearly all 
employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern U.S. 
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Vignette #4C 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. Also, the R Company has not 
contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has not helped to 
make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a black male) is the CEO of the firm 
and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus each year that the 
firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn approximately $40,000 
per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, 
employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary adjustment each year; nearly all 
employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern U.S. 
Vignette #4D 
The R Company is a large national corporation that makes a wide variety of 
consumer goods and employs people in production and distribution facilities in several 
small southern communities. The R Company, which was started in 1965, takes pride in 
three areas: (1) building customer loyalty through quality products, (2) contributing to 
the communities in which they operate, and (3) providing above average return to 
stockholders. The R Company has fallen a little short of its profit goals for the last 
three years, and stockholders want higher returns. Also, the R Company has not 
contributed to the communities in which it has locations and has not helped to 
make them better places to work. Albert Smith (a white male) is the CEO of the firm 
and earns over $200,000 a year in salary, including a $10,000 bonus each year that the 
firm meets its profit goals. The employees in R Company earn approximately $40,000 
per year, with health benefits, but no profit-sharing or bonus opportunities. Typically, 
employees can expect a 1 - 2 % cost of living salary adjustment each year; nearly all 
employees live in small low-cost towns in the southern U.S. 
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Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire (Heneman & Schwab, 1985) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. My take-home pay 
2. My benefit package 
3. My most recent raise 
4. Influence my supervisor has on my pay 
5. My current salary 
6. Amount the company pays towards my benefits 
7. The raises I have typically received in the past 
8. The company's pay structure 
9. Information the company gives about pay issues of concern to me 
10. My overall level of pay 
11. The value of my benefits 
12. Pay of other jobs in the company 
13. Consistency of the company's pay policy 
14. Size of my current salary 
15. The number of benefits I receive 
16. How my raises are determined 
17. Differences in pay among job in the company 
18. How the company administers pay 
Equity Sensitivity Instrument 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. I do my best work when my job assignments are fairly difficult. 
2. I try very hard to improve on my past performance at work. 
3. I take moderate risks and stick my neck out to get ahead at work. 
4. I try to avoid any added responsibilities on my job. 
5. I try to perform better than my co-workers. 
Equity Preference Questionnaire (Sauley & Bedeian, 2000) 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. At work, my greatest concern is whether or not I am doing the best job I can. 
2. A job that requires me to be busy during the day is better than a job that allows 
me a lot of loafing. 
3. At work, I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 
4. I would become very dissatisfied with my job if I had little or no work to do. 
5. All other things being equal, it is better to have a job with a lot of duties and 
responsibilities than one with few duties and responsibilities. 
6. I am most satisfied at work when I have to do as little as possible. 
7. When I am at my job, I think of ways to get out of work. 
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8. If I could get away with it, I would try to work just a little bit slower than the boss 
expects. 
9. It is really satisfying to me when I can get something for nothing at work. 
10. It is the smart employee who gets as much as s/he can while giving as little as 
possible in return. 
11. Employees who are more concerned about what they can get from their employer 
rather than what they can give to their employer are the wise ones. 
12. If I had to work hard all day at my job, I would probably quit. 
13. When I have completed my task for the day, I help out other employees who have 
yet to complete their tasks. 
14. Even if I received low wages and poor benefits from my employer, I would still 
try to do my best at my job. 
15.1 feel obligated to do more than I am paid to do at work. 
Company Reputation 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. I would be proud to be an employee of R Company. 
2. R Company has a good reputation in the community. 
3. I have a great deal of interest in R Company and its future. 
4. R Company is a good company to work for. 
5. People take pride in the quality of work done at R Company. 
6. I would not hesitate to purchase products made by R Company. 
7. R Company gives back to society through nonprofits and worthwhile causes. 
CEO Reputation 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. The CEO of R Company tries to maintain good morale 
2. The CEO of R Company ensures that effective support systems are in place to 
benefit all stakeholders 
3. The CEO of R Company gives credit and praise for a job well done 
4. The CEO of R Company is fair 
5. The CEO of R Company is fairly compensated for what he does for the company 
6. The CEO of R Company ensures that diversity management is practiced 
7. The CEO of R Company ensures that all employees, regardless of gender or 
ethnicity are treated fairly 
8. The CEO of R Company is underpaid for his performance and contributions 
9. The CEO of R Company is overpaid for his performance and contributions 
10. The CEO of R Company's pay does not impact the morale of workers 
11. The CEO of R Company is interested in the welfare of employees 
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Manipulation Checks 
1 = Very Low, 5 = Very High 
1. I think that this CEO's total pay (salary and bonuses) is 
2. I think the employees' total pay is 
3. I think this company's financial performance is 
4. I think this company's contribution to society is 
Pay Equity 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
1. I think that the level of pay of the CEO of R Company is fair. 
2. I think that if the CEO of R Company performs well, there is an appropriate 
reward for him. 
3. I think that the bonus opportunity for the CEO of R Company is fair. 
4. Taking into account the responsibilities he has, the pay of the CEO of R Company 
is fair. 
5. Taking into account the amount of education and training he has, the pay of the 
CEO of R Company is fair. 
6. Taking into account the amount of effort he puts forth, the pay of the CEO of R 
Company is fair. 
7. Taking into account the stresses and strains of the job, the pay of the CEO of R 
Company is fair. 
8. I think that the level of pay of the employee of R Company is fair. 
9. I think that if the CEO of R Company performs well, there is an appropriate 
reward for him. 
10.1 think that the salary adjustment for the employees of R Company is fair. 
11. Taking into account the responsibilities they have, the pay of the employees of R 
Company is fair. 
12. Taking into account the amount of education and training they have, the pay of 
the employees of R Company is fair. 
13. Taking into account the amount of effort they put forth, the pay of the employees 
of R Company is fair. 
14. Taking into account the stresses and strains of the jobs, the pay of the employees 
of R Company is fair. 
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